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A MASTERPIECE OF SIMPLICITY: TOWARD 
A YODERIAN FREE EXERCISE 




The Free Exercise Clause was enacted to protect diverse modes of religious 
practice.  Yet certain expressions of free exercise have entailed concomitant 
harm to those outside the religious community, especially LGBTQ persons.  
This trend has been acutely present in the recent onslaught of wedding-vendor 
cases: LGBTQ persons seek the enforcement of statutorily protected rights, 
while religious objectors seek refuge from state intrusion under constitutional 
shelter.  Consequently, wedding-vendor cases present an area of law in which 
free-exercise jurisprudence and anti-discrimination jurisprudence have been 
clashing. 
However, despite the primacy of religious freedom and equal protection in 
American jurisprudence, courts analyze wedding-vendor cases in widely 
disparate ways.  At times, they are under-protective of members of the LGBTQ 
community; at others, they penalize wedding-vendors and chill longstanding 
religious practices.  Thus, the prevailing analytical paradigms are flimsy and 
lead to unpredictable outcomes.  This deficiency came to light as the Supreme 
Court addressed these complex legal issues in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission.  There, the Masterpiece Court’s holding is 
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diffident and provides scant guidance to the lower courts in which these cases 
continue to percolate.  Yet Masterpiece’s significance has been broadly 
misconstrued by commentators.  Therefore, in order to clarify a muddled sphere 
of free-exercise and anti-discrimination jurisprudence, this Article’s task is 
twofold.  First, it provides an interpretive lens for Masterpiece that is in tension 
with the general body of commentary surrounding the decision.  Far from a 
victory for religious rights advocates, Masterpiece portended a path to 
analyzing free exercise claims according to a paradigm that disfavors religious 
liberties (if its line of reasoning persists).   
This Article’s second task is to advance a framework for analyzing 
wedding-vendor cases.  This framework employs objective criteria from 
Wisconsin v. Yoder when examining requests of religious exemption to public 
accommodations laws—an approach that has fallen into judicial disuse given 
its ostensible burden on free exercise.  Then, after Yoderian vetting criteria are 
satisfied, this framework allows for a narrow exception to small business 
owners that can demonstrate their religious practices’ rootedness in a 
longstanding religious tradition.  This template would cause multiple parties to 
cede ground and reduce some of the strongest tensions in this area of law.  As 
such, it would strike a more prudent balance between the dignitary rights of 
LGBTQ persons and the free-exercise rights of religious objectors. 
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“Opposition is True Friendship.”1 
“I have become all things to all people.”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When a same-sex couple approached cakeshop owner Jack Phillips to 
create their wedding cake in 2012, it is unlikely that either the couple or Phillips 
realized the attention that their brief encounter would attract for the quiet town 
of Lakewood, Colorado.  Indeed, in due course their encounter would capture 
audiences of major news media and spark fierce debate from scholars, jurists, 
and laypeople.  Yet it is even less likely that either of the parties realized the 
potential constitutional significance of their encounter.  
Phillips refused to design a cake for Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins 
because of his religious convictions concerning same-sex marriage,3 
implicating free exercise and free speech protections that have longstanding 
roots in our constitutional tradition.  And for the couple, it did not matter that 
Phillips offered to sell them any other product besides a wedding cake—say, 
brownies or other cakes.4  The dignitary harm that the couple suffered as a result 
of Phillips’s refusal was already wrought,5 implicating notions of equal 
protection that have similarly longstanding roots in our constitutional tradition. 
 
1. WILLIAM BLAKE, A Memorable Fancy, in THE MARRIAGE OF HEAVEN AND HELL 79 
(Michael Phillips ed., 2011). 
2. 1 Corinthians 9:22. 
3. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018). 
4. Id.  Phillips explained that he would “make [the couple] birthday cakes, shower cakes, [or] 
sell [them] cookies and brownies.”  Id. 
5. Id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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So when their dispute was brought before the Supreme Court of the United 
States, it seemed as though an unstoppable jurisprudential force—the Court’s 
doctrine upholding the dignitary rights of those within protected classes—
would meet an immovable jurisprudential object—the Court’s inveterate 
protection of free exercise claims.6  
The State Administrative Law Judge reviewing the couple’s discrimination 
complaint decided that Phillips’s refusal represented an impermissible violation 
of Colorado public accommodations law.7  And on appeal, this judgment was 
doubly affirmed—first by the Civil Rights Commission,8 then by the Colorado 
Court of Appeals.9  
Therefore, when the Court granted certiorari,10 it looked as though 
constitutional doctrine of momentous proportions would be handed down.  
Tension built, and expectations reached their highest inflection the day the case 
was decided, June 4, 2018.11  Numerous people rallied outside the courthouse: 
reporters, picketers, and curious passersby alike.12  For those who backed 
Phillips, the Court’s decision was a victory met with jubilant cheers, and crowds 
of supporters flocked to Masterpiece Cakeshop the following day to 
congratulate him.13  For those who backed Craig and Mullins, the decision was 
 
6. Although current free exercise jurisprudence is somewhat enigmatic, free exercise burdens 
traditionally received strict scrutiny.  Therefore, if Colorado’s public accommodations law inhibited 
Phillips’s right to exercise his religion, it would have to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest.  See infra note 45–50 and accompanying text. 
7. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1726. 
8. Id.  
9. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo. App. 2015).  
10. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). 
11. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Baker Who Would Not Make Wedding 
Cake for Gay Couple, WASH. POST (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-rules-in-favor-of-baker-who-
would-not-make-wedding-cake-for-gay-couple/2018/06/04/50c68cf8-6802-11e8-bea7-
c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?utm_term=.e08466b7f19a [https://perma.cc/47B5-6M82] (discussing the 
events that led up to the decision date). 
12. See Adam Liptak, In Narrow Decision, Supreme Court Sides With Baker Who Turned Away 
Gay Couple, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/us/politics/supreme-
court-sides-with-baker-who-turned-away-gay-couple.html [https://perma.cc/NV24-CUSB] (narrating 
the attendant circumstances of the alleged victory). 
13. See Trevor Hughes, At Masterpiece Cakeshop, Cheers and Smiles for Jack Phillips After 
Supreme Court Ruling, USA TODAY (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/06/04/masterpiece-cake-shop-supreme-court-
ruling/670393002/ [https://perma.cc/2LLS-P7XX] (discussing Phillips’s customers visiting his 
cakeshop to congratulate him on victory). 
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a deep disappointment.14  For those concerned with constitutional doctrine, 
however, the Court’s decision should be underwhelming. 
In an area of jurisprudence already awash in words,15 the Masterpiece 
opinion added little to the conversation, even though it had tremendous 
potential to clarify the rights of religious objectors and LGBTQ persons.  The 
ruling, it would seem, represented a victory for religious freedom advocates, 
and a cacophony of voices have amassed to confirm this interpretation of the 
Supreme Court’s most recent free-exercise ruling.16  Some choose to view the 
case as a deep loss for LGBTQ rights, while others view it as a resounding win 
for conservatives.17  Many, still, situate the case somewhere in between in light 
of the Court’s underlying rationale, suggesting that the opinion represents a 
win—but only a qualified win—for religious liberty proponents.18  But most 
commentators view the case as favorable for religious liberty.19 
This Article advances an interpretive lens for the Court’s ruling that is in 
tension with the general body of commentary surrounding the decision—a lens 
that goes beyond the decision’s mere result and looks instead at what the 
Court’s language and rationale might presage.  In this vein, the Article argues 
that, far from a victory for religious-rights advocates, the Masterpiece Court 
tilted the balance in favor of LGBTQ rights under its public accommodations 
 
14. See, e.g., Silas House, The Masterpiece Decision Isn’t Harmless, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/opinion/masterpiece-cakeshop-decision-kentucky.html 
[https://perma.cc/G7CJ-TL5T] (describing the events in a deflated light); Jim Downs, We’re Looking 
at the Masterpiece Cakeshop Case All Wrong.  And So Did the Supreme Court: Why the Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Decision Was a Major Loss for Gay Rights, WASH. POST (June 6, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/06/06/were-looking-at-the-
masterpiece-cakeshop-case-all-wrong-and-so-did-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/W2GU-FDJS] 
(arguing that the decision was a loss for the LGBTQ community). 
15. That is, the intersection of anti-discrimination jurisprudence and free exercise jurisprudence. 
16. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 12; House, supra note 14. 
17. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
18. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock & Thomas Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop–Not As Narrow As May 
First Appear, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2018, 3:48 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-masterpiece-cakeshop-not-as-narrow-as-may-first-
appear [https://perma.cc/6HWF-ES82] (providing a cautious interpretation of the decision, and paying 
attention to potential negative and positive nuances). 
19. See, e.g., Todd Starnes, A Win for Masterpiece Cakeshop but it Ain’t Over Yet, FOX NEWS 
(June 4, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/todd-starnes-a-win-for-masterpiece-cakeshop-but-
it-aint-over-yet [https://perma.cc/97D4-Q858] (interpreting the decision in an optimistic light); Jack 
Crowe, SCOTUS Rules in Favor of Baker Who Refused to Make LGBT-Wedding Cake, NAT’L REV. 
(June 4, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/news/masterpiece-cakeshop-religious-liberty-wins-
landslide [https://perma.cc/59JZ-QYD2] (portraying the decision as a win for religious liberty). 
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jurisprudence.  In light of this trajectory, the Article then provides a predictive 
framework for how the Court will likely rule in cases with analogous plaintiffs 
and defendants—that is, if it were to follow the same line of reasoning guiding 
Masterpiece.20  The analysis anticipates an arc toward more expansive 
protection for LGBTQ people, along with a reduction in free-exercise 
exceptions.  Not only is this demonstrated through the Court’s discrete 
treatment of claims to religious rights and civil rights (by pitting them against 
each other), but it is also demonstrated through the manner in which the Court 
employed precedent from the race-based anti-discrimination context and the 
free speech context.   
To this end, Part II traces the development of free-exercise doctrine, 
especially as it implicates other rights of constitutional import.  It shows that 
the Court’s treatment of free exercise claims has been undulant but has 
ultimately displayed a trajectory toward casting strict-scrutiny protection over 
religious persons.  More recently, however, the Court has departed from this 
trend, leaving the status of the Free Exercise Clause in doubt.  Part III examines 
the Masterpiece opinion itself—briefly interposing explanations of the anti-
discrimination jurisprudence and the free-speech jurisprudence necessary to 
understand religious exemptions in wedding-vendor cases.  
Part IV criticizes the opinion and argues that, in resolving wedding-vendor 
disputes, it is not only important to recognize resemblances between various 
modes of discrimination, but it is also crucial to parse the distinctive features of 
protected classes of citizens and the discrimination they face.  Similarly 
important is the recognition of the different doctrinal work that the Free 
Exercise Clause, public-accommodations regimes, and Free Speech Clause 
should do. 
Part V uses these foregoing accounts and appraisals to propose a paradigm 
for analyzing future wedding-vendor cases as well as claims that implicate 
religious rights and other imperative legal rights (be they constitutional or 
statutory).  This framework would employ objective criteria to assess the 
sincerity of exemption seekers, then apply strict scrutiny to analyze 
governmental actions that infringe upon free exercise rights.  It would allow for 
a narrow, limited exception to public accommodations laws for small private 
business owners but only under preliminary vetting mechanisms.  Ultimately, 
this Article aims to advance a template that would invite greater clarity, 
 
20. This is to acknowledge that the composition of the Court, as of this publication, is different 
from what it was when Masterpiece was handed down.  See infra note 182 and accompanying text.  
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predictability, and constitutional balance—for the dignitary rights of LGBTQ 
persons and the free-exercise rights of religious objectors.  
II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court’s free-exercise jurisprudence has been anything but 
clear or predictable.  Indeed, the Court has vacillated between granting 
extensive protection to religious practices and promoting the government’s 
interest in regulating religious activity.  Ultimately, though, the constellation of 
the Court’s free-exercise decisions has displayed a trend toward heightened 
scrutiny of laws burdening religious exercise and greater protection for 
religious claimants. 
A. First Forays into Free Exercise Analysis: The Belief-Action Doctrine 
Justice Rutledge once remarked that “[n]o provision of the Constitution is 
more closely tied to or given content by its generating history than the religious 
clause of the First Amendment.”21  Therefore, before plunging into the doctrine 
undergirding Masterpiece and other wedding-vendor cases, the development of 
doctrine in this arena warrants attention.  
The Religion Clause states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”22  Like 
so many of its sister provisions in the Bill of Rights, the Free Exercise Clause 
has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.23  The dual 
concerns of the Religion Clauses often implicate each other—in legal doctrine, 
if not in practical application—and the Court has often been forced to navigate 
between establishment concerns on the one hand, and free exercise concerns on 
the other.24  
 
21. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  This is not to 
suggest that Justice Rutledge understood the generating history of the religious clause.  
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
23. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The . . . concept of liberty embodied in 
[the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.”).  
24. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (observing that the religion clauses 
are designed “to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [religion or government] into the 
precincts of the other.”); David E. Fitzkee & Linell A. Letendre, Religion in the Military: Navigating 
the Channel between the Religion Clauses, 59 A.F. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (discussing the dual concerns 
of the Religion Clause in the military context and highlighting the “complex array of constitutional 
tests [that] attempt to navigate the narrow channel between the free exercise of religion . . . and 
establishment of religion, . . . a feat compared to navigating the narrow channel between the Scylla and 
Charybdis in Greek mythology”) (citation omitted). 
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It would be easy enough to ensure that religious people can think as they 
wish.  And early cases on the Free Exercise Clause attempted to do just that.  In 
Reynolds v. United States,25 for example, the Court first invoked the belief-
action doctrine to uphold the criminality of polygamy against Mormons who 
were claiming a constitutional entitlement to polygamy, a marriage practice 
integral to Mormon faith at the time.26  This more cerebral jurisprudence 
suggested that as long as the government has not attempted to regulate religious 
opinions or beliefs, then it has not contravened the Free Exercise Clause by 
regulating practices and actions.27  Appeals to this doctrine persisted for over 
sixty years until the doctrine began to deteriorate.28  
Two problems emerged from the application of the belief-action doctrine.  
The first was philosophical: defining action can be a difficult task for courts, or 
for anyone.  Indeed, can’t inaction be more potent than action?29  If a student 
refrains from saluting a flag because of his religious beliefs, has he thereby 
acted?30  Is prayer action?31  Philosophical queries in this vein tend to multiply 
when a constitutional doctrine hinges on the dichotomy between belief and 
action.32  
The second (and more important) problem with the belief-action doctrine 
was practical: The Free Exercise Clause ought to extend to practices.33  “Free 
Exercise Clause” is not a misnomer.  That is, it was not intended to be consigned 
to the realm of thought, but was designed to protect practices.34  Just as the 
freedom to possess a certain status or orientation is inadequate to protect the 
 
25. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
26. Id. at 167. 
27. See id. at 164–66.  For a terse but rich discussion of the belief-action doctrine, see Harrop A. 
Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806, 818 (1958) (discussing the belief-
action doctrine). 
28. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940). 
29. See Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 520 (2012) (employing the passive-
active distinction to support the Court’s holding).  See infra Section IV.B. for a comprehensive 
treatment of this issue’s relevance to speech. 
30. Minersville, 310 U.S. at 591. 
31. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 455 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (highlighting the 
difficulty of distinguishing between belief and action when analyzing prayer). 
32. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 
(2018). 
33. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 85 (2017) 
(“[T]he government has powerful reasons, rooted in free exercise values, to want to spare citizens the 
cruel choice of deciding whether to disobey either the government or their God.”). 
34. Id. 
 
ROGERS_FINAL_25NOV19 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2019  7:12 AM 
2019] A MASTERPIECE OF SIMPLICITY 171 
 
 
Equal Protection rights of LGBTQ persons,35 so too is the freedom to believe 
inadequate to protect the First Amendment rights of religious persons.36  Thus, 
in time the belief-action doctrine failed to pass constitutional muster.37  And for 
good reason: a constitutional value worth protecting in thought alone is no 
constitutional value at all.  
B. Development into Strict Scrutiny 
In the process of shedding the belief-action doctrine, courts articulated 
principles that extended the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.38  Cantwell 
v. Connecticut39 provides an example of the Supreme Court’s free-exercise 
doctrine during this transitional phase.40  There, the Court overturned 
Cantwell’s conviction for inciting a breach of peace, a conviction he received 
by proselytizing. 41  The Court stated that “the power to regulate [religious 
conduct] must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to 
infringe the protected freedom.”42  Therefore, if Connecticut wished to 
criminalize Cantwell’s religious solicitations, it would have to show that 
Cantwell’s conduct presented an “immediate threat to public safety, peace, or 
order.”43  This public safety-peace-order triad represents one of the first 
intimations of heightened scrutiny for the Court.44 
Over time, the various iterations of free-exercise protection coalesced into 
a univocal strict scrutiny standard.  In Sherbert v. Verner,45 for example, a 
Seventh Day Adventist was denied unemployment compensation because she 
 
35. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
36. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.  
37. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217 (1972) (discussing the interdependent 
relationship between “religious beliefs and what we would call today ‘life style’” before granting the 
Amish an exemption from state compulsory education law). 
38. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304, 311 (1940) (suggesting a trajectory 
toward strict scrutiny even though the Court used a lower standard of review). 
39. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
40. That said, the Court did still adhere to some form of the belief-action doctrine, albeit a 
diminished one.  Id. at 303. 
41. Id. at 309, 311. 
42. Id. at 304.  
43. Id. at 308. 
44. Id. 
45. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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refused to accept jobs that required her to work on her religious Sabbath.46  
Consequently, she alleged that her free exercise rights were violated by South 
Carolina’s rejection of her claims to unemployment benefits.47  
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed.48  In doing so, the Court articulated its 
standard for free-exercise analysis in no uncertain terms: “If . . . the South 
Carolina Supreme Court[‘s decision] is to withstand appellant’s constitutional 
challenge, it must be . . . justified by a ‘compelling state interest.’”49  To stress 
the weight the Court placed on free-exercise values, the Court stated that “in 
this highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘only the gravest abuses, endangering 
paramount interest, give occasion for permissible limitation’ [of free-exercise 
rights].”50  Thus, in the Supreme Court’s “first and leading case in . . . modern 
free exercise jurisprudence,”51 South Carolina was “constitutionally compelled 
to carve out an exception . . . for those whose unavailability [was] due to their 
religious convictions.”52  Sherbert therefore has enabled religious objectors to 
challenge a vast array of laws and regulations that are incompatible with the 
objectors’ religious tenets.53  These challenges have principally been generated 
through requests for exemptions from, rather than demands for the invalidation 
of, laws that suppress religious conduct.54  And laws have typically been 
challenged because they either penalize religiously motivated conduct or 
penalize the refusal to perform legally required conduct on religious grounds.55 
 
46. Id. at 399–402.  The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act stated that a claimant 
was ineligible for compensation if she “failed, without good cause, . . . to accept available suitable 
work when offered.”  S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-114(3)(a) (1962), reprinted in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400 
n.3. 
47. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401. 
48. Id. at 402.  
49. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).  This standard prevailed 
for over a quarter of a century.  See infra Section II.C. 
50. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
51. Michael W. McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (1990). 
52. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 420 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  Although this quotation 
appears in Justice Harlan’s dissent, he was stating what the majority’s decision had de facto effected. 
Id.  
53. See id. at 401–02. 
54. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). 
55. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 692–93 (2014); McConnell, supra note 
51, at 1412–13.  
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One case in particular illustrates the Court’s tendency to grant exemptions 
to laws that burden the free exercise of religion.  In Wisconsin v. Yoder,56 the 
Court applied strict scrutiny review to exempt Amish families from compulsory 
public education in light of the Amish tradition’s emphasis on vocational 
training.57  Despite the general applicability of the compulsory education law, 
the Court still subjected the law to a balancing test because the law placed a 
burden on the families’ religious vocational principles.58  
The Court reiterated the principles animating the Free Exercise Clause, 
noting that “[t]he values underlying these two provisions [of the First 
Amendment] relating to religion have been zealously protected, sometimes 
even at the expense of other interests. . . .  [O]nly those interests of the highest 
order . . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”59  
It should not be overlooked that, during this era—namely, the Warren Court’s 
reign—the same Court repeatedly articulated the government’s interest in 
education as being among its highest and most enduring.60  
Noteworthy was the Court’s insistence that the case could not be resolved 
on the grounds that Wisconsin’s education law did not facially discriminate 
against religions and applied uniformly to all Wisconsin citizens.61  Nor did it 
matter that the statute was motivated by legitimate secular concerns.62  Instead, 
the Court held that “[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, 
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement . . . if it unduly burdens the 
free exercise of religion.”63  Thus, it mattered little for the Court that the 
 
56. 406 U.S. 205. 
57. Id. at 222. 
58. Id. at 214–15.  
59. Id. 
60. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).  In this watershed 
school desegregation decision, the U.S. Supreme Court famously remarked that “education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments.”  Id.; see generally MICHAEL REBELL, 
FLUNKING DEMOCRACY: SCHOOLS, COURTS, AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION (2018) (casting education as 
one of the state’s most vital purposes and arguing that civic discourse and democratic values are waning 
in the United States as a result of inadequate educational funding and curricula). 
61. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220. 
62. Id. at 216. 
63. Id. at 220 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
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Wisconsin provision was generally applicable or neutral if the provision 
burdened religious practice notwithstanding.64 
A critical feature of the Court’s rationale that extends to the wedding-
vendor context was its requirement that the claims of free exercise be 
“legitimate.”65  To prove this legitimacy, the Court placed considerable weight 
on the evidence—proffered by expert witnesses, testimony, and documents—
demonstrating that the religious practice under examination was a) embedded 
in the claimant’s religious tradition, b) pursuant to a sincerely held religious 
belief, and c) vital to the Amish community.66  In other words, religious 
tradition and sincerity mattered a great deal in determining whether an 
exemption would be appropriate for the religious objector under 
consideration.67 
Thus, through accretively protective rulings like those in Cantwell, 
Sherbert, and Yoder, the belief-action doctrine eventually gave way to strict 
scrutiny protection in free exercise jurisprudence.  This heightened standard of 
review often extended to religious objectors through exemptions.  However, 
this free exercise doctrine would become somewhat convoluted in years to 
come.  
C. The Unsure Footing of the Court’s Free Exercise Jurisprudence  
Under Smith 
In true bull-in-china-shop fashion, a 5-4 majority of the Court disheveled 
the foregoing doctrinal development in Employment Division v. Smith,68 
spinning free exercise jurisprudence into a doctrinal vertigo from which it has 
yet to recover.  For this reason, Smith warrants closer examination. 
 
64. For a detailed account of what constitutes a burden on free exercise, see Ira C. Lupu, Where 
Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 942 
(1989) (highlighting the multiple factors that a court employs). 
65. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.  
66. Id. at 215, 235. 
67. Id. (“It cannot be overemphasized that we are not dealing with a way of life and mode of 
education by a group claiming to have recently discovered some ‘progressive’ or more enlightened 
process for rearing children for modern life.  Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable 
religious sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the 
Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the 
interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the 
continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and their religious organization, and the hazards 
presented by the State’s enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.”). 
68. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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In Smith, two workers were fired for ingesting peyote in violation of Oregon 
law.69  Because they were dismissed for “misconduct,” the State denied their 
unemployment compensation benefits.70  The Oregon Court of Appeals 
reversed this denial on free exercise grounds,71 and the Oregon Supreme Court 
similarly held that the State could not deny unemployment compensation to the 
workers because peyote was an integral part of their religious practices.72  
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, disagreed with the Oregon Supreme 
Court and found its reliance on the balancing test, taken from Sherbert and its 
progeny, to be unfounded.73  He reasoned that Smith involved a “valid and 
neutral law of general applicability” and therefore did not need to be justified 
by a compelling governmental interest.74  Contrary to Smith, he argued, the line 
of cases that have applied strict scrutiny usually implicated free exercise rights 
in conjunction with some other right.75  This analysis gave rise to what some 
have coined the “hybrid rights doctrine,” which rewards heightened scrutiny to 
laws that undermine two or more constitutional interests.76  Whatever the merits 
of this doctrine, the Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court and held that 
Oregon could deny the respondents’ unemployment compensation without 
violating the Free Exercise Clause.77 
The majority opinion elicited fierce concurring and dissenting opinions.  
For her part, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence criticized the majority’s sweeping 
assertion that the Court’s “usual free exercise jurisprudence does not even 
apply” if a law is generally applicable.78  Justice O’Connor echoed the Yoder 
Court’s insistence that a law’s general and neutral applicability in no way 
provides that law with a talismanic pass to unduly burden religious practices.79  
In fact, she argued that “few States would be so naïve as to enact a law directly 
 
69. Id. at 874.  
70. Id. 
71. Smith v. Emp’t Div., 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of 
Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
72. Id. 
73. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 884. 
74. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
75. Id. at 881. 
76. Ryan S. Rummage, Comment, In Combination: Using Hybrid Rights to Expand Religious 
Liberty, 64 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1180 (2015). 
77. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
78. Id. at 892 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
79. Id. 
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prohibiting or burdening religious practice as such . . . .  [L]aws neutral toward 
religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon 
his religious duties just as effectively. . . .”80  
Justice O’Connor also argued that the Court had consistently applied the 
Sherbert balancing test and that case after case had “affirmed that test as a 
fundamental part of . . . First Amendment doctrine.”81  And the Court had never 
distinguished between the type of free exercise right being asserted to determine 
whether to apply the Sherbert compelling interest test, as the majority 
claimed.82  That is because, in Justice O’Connor’s view, “[t]he compelling 
interest test effectuates the First Amendment’s command that religious liberty 
is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, and that the Court 
will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, 
unless required by clear and compelling governmental interests of the highest 
order.”83 
Justice O’Connor therefore could not sign on to the majority’s repudiation 
of the compelling interest test.84  Instead, in applying that test to the facts of 
Smith, she argued that striking the sensible balance between religious freedom 
and compelling state interests required the Court to conclude that the 
prohibition of peyote was a compelling state interest that would override the 
workers’ religious interests.85  In other words, the law should have been upheld 
as an expression of a compelling government interest. 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent largely tracked with Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence.  He argued that a narrow religious exemption should have been 
granted to adequately address the competing interests at stake.86  In defending 
this position, he drew attention to the weakness of the slippery slope arguments 
proffered by the majority—arguments that often accompany exemption 
requests.87  To prevent similar (and often frivolous) exemption requests, Justice 
Blackmun observed that those claiming an entitlement to exemption should 
demonstrate the religious practice’s embeddedness within a specific religious 
 
80. Id. at 894, 901; accord infra notes 242–43 and accompanying text; cf. infra Section III.A. 
81. Smith, 494 U.S. at 900 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
82. Id. at 898. 
83. Id. at 895 (internal quotations omitted). 
84. Id. at 894–95.   
85. Id. at 906–07. 
86. Id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
87. Id. at 916–17. 
 
ROGERS_FINAL_25NOV19 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2019  7:12 AM 
2019] A MASTERPIECE OF SIMPLICITY 177 
 
 
tradition, as was the case in Yoder.88  Hence, Justice Blackmun considered a 
Yoderian template to sufficiently protect free exercise interests as well as the 
interests of the state. 
Smith upended decades of doctrine and generated ardent criticism.  The 
opinion not only repudiated the longstanding strict-scrutiny balancing test from 
Sherbert, but it also revived a test that had long since fallen into disuse—the 
belief-action doctrine.89  For these reasons, Smith was not without pushback, 
and it is chiefly responsible for the complications and impasses courts face as 
they attempt to resolve the wedding-vendor cases roiling throughout the 
nation.90  But Smith’s holding was never briefed or argued by either party, and 
it has not been interpreted in the law as an established doctrine.91  In fact, 
Smith’s rule has been interpreted by the Court on only one abbreviated 
occasion, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.92  And the 
facts of Lukumi demonstrated such obvious governmental animus that the Court 
would have ruled the same way regardless of the standard employed.93  Hence, 
Smith and Lukumi stand as poor precedents for wedding-vendor cases insofar 
as the facts from Smith and Lukumi are polarized at opposite ends of a spectrum 
of government infringement. 
Smith left jurists in a state of uncertainty vis-à-vis the status of the Free 
Exercise Clause.  And this uncertainty persists today.  Are “hybrid rights” 
deserving of heightened scrutiny?  What standard should be applied to which 
 
88. Id. at 917–20.  This will be taken up in Part V and be an integral component of this Article’s 
proposal. 
89. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883–84, 890 (1990). 
90. See, e.g., Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 568 (Wash. 2017), vacated, 
138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426, 431–32 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2018); Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051, 1087 (Or. Ct. App. 2017). 
91. See, e.g., Brief of Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 
WL 4005662, at *6 (“Smith’s rule . . . has not become embedded in the law.”).  Professor Laycock, 
author of the CLS brief, is one of the nation’s leading authorities on the Religion Clauses and has 
litigated both sides of religious liberty and same-sex marriage issues. 
92. 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).  For a discussion of Lukumi being the sole interpretive gloss of 
Smith, see Brief of Christian Legal Society et al., supra note 91, at 6. 
93. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 536.  There, city ordinances purposefully targeted the practices of 
animal sacrifice in order to stifle the Santeria religious practices that were proliferating in the Hialeah 
area.  Id. at 542.  Lukumi interpreted the neutral and general applicability standard from Smith to be 
discrete requirements and found that the laws were neither neutral nor generally applicable, id. at 545, 
and that the ordinances were not justified by a compelling interest in light of their non-neutral and non-
general application, id. at 546. 
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type of free exercise claim?  Does it make a difference if a religious person is 
claiming exemption to a criminal or civil statute?  All of these questions, and 
many more, the Smith Court left unanswered. 
Accordingly, at present, free exercise jurisprudence is anything but stable 
or settled, and courts and religious persons are not left the better for it.  This 
unsteadiness has found expression time and again in lower court decisions 
grappling with wedding-vendor cases.94  However, because the Masterpiece 
Court genuflected to the race-based public accommodations and free speech 
line of cases, the Court never clarified Smith’s pertinence to the current context 
of wedding cases.95  
III. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND 
Masterpiece should not be envisaged to protect the religious freedoms of 
wedding vendors in future cases.  Rather, rightly understood, it is a case that 
recedes religious freedom—if the Court continues on its current trajectory, that 
is.  This Part argues that, as precedent, Masterpiece is a blind alley set to lead 
lower courts astray.  Applying Masterpiece’s operative legal rationale would 
further muddle an already-murky free exercise doctrine and would scarcely 
produce resolutions that take seriously the heart of the legal issues at stake—
largely because it eschews them altogether.  Before mounting too much 
criticism of the decision, though, a glimpse of its facts is warranted.  
A. Factual Background 
The facts of Masterpiece have been briefly sketched above.  To summarize, 
in 2012 a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece Cakeshop to confer with the 
owner, Jack Phillips, about designing a wedding cake to celebrate the couple’s 
upcoming marriage.96  Because Phillips expressed that he would not design the 
wedding cake in light of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage and 
Colorado’s refusal to legally recognize the same,97 the couple filed a complaint 
 
94. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d at 434 (collecting cases). 
95. See generally Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719. 
96. Id. at 1720. 
97. One of Phillips’s religious beliefs is that “God’s intention for marriage from the beginning 
of history is that it is and should be the union of one man and one woman.”  Id. at 1724.  And neither 
the parties nor the Court contested the sincerity of Phillips’s beliefs.  Id. at 1721.  Furthermore, although 
ultimately immaterial to resolving this important case, the Court mentions on multiple occasions that 
same-sex marriage was not federally recognized at the time of the dispute.  See, e.g., id.  Whether this 
point actually mattered for the Court is unclear.  
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with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission shortly after their encounter with 
Phillips.98  The complaint alleged that Phillips violated the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act (CADA) by discriminating against them on the basis of 
their sexual orientation.99  After opening an investigation, the Commission 
referred the case to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who found that 
Phillips’s actions constituted a violation of CADA and ruled in favor of the 
couple.100  Phillips raised two constitutional challenges to CADA before the 
ALJ, both of which found a home in the First Amendment.101 
Phillips’s principal claim was (perhaps curiously) a free-speech claim.102  
In support, Phillips appealed to the First Amendment’s expressive-speech line 
of cases, the most germane of which is Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & 
Bisexual Grp. of Boston.103  There, a group of LGBTQ Irish immigrants 
organized to march in Boston’s Saint Patrick’s Day parade.104  But when the 
parade sponsors denied the LGBTQ group’s equal admission to march in the 
parade, the group sued the private organizers, alleging violations of 
Massachusetts’ public accommodations law, which prohibited discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.105  Although the public accommodations law 
did not facially violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments, the Court 
unanimously held that the public accommodations law’s application 
 
98. Id. at 1725. 
99. Id.  In relevant part, the CADA provides: 
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to 
refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, 
race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or 
ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation.  
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2017) (emphasis added).  CADA defines “place of public 
accommodation” as “any place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering 
services . . . to the public.”  Id. § 24-34-601(1).  This definition, though broad, excludes “a church, 
synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes.”  Id.  
100. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1725–26.  Procedurally, the case is more complex and exhaustive 
given the logistics of hearings and deliberative sessions with the Commission.  For simplicity’s sake, 
the procedural posture has been distilled to highlight its most salient features.  For detail regarding how 
the Commission hearing and deliberative session took place, see id. at 1725–26. 
101. Id. at 1726. 
102. Id.  
103. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
104. Id. at 561. 
105. Id.  
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contravened the sponsor’s right to free speech when applied.106  Insofar as the 
parade represented “expressive conduct,” the Court granted the parade 
organizers an exemption to the public accommodations law.107  
A similar free speech argument was Phillips’s first line of attack against 
CADA.  He argued that CADA violated the Free Speech Clause by compelling 
him to effectuate his artistic abilities to express a message with which he 
vehemently disagreed—namely, that same-sex marriage is an institution worth 
celebrating.108  The ALJ rejected this argument and disagreed that creating a 
wedding cake celebrating same-sex marriage would force Phillips to convey an 
ideological message with which he disagreed.109  
Phillips’s secondary claim was that compelling him to design a cake for 
same-sex weddings would violate his free exercise rights; by creating the 
wedding cake, Phillips would endorse or celebrate same-sex marriage and 
thereby compromise his faith.110  Applying Smith, the ALJ rejected this claim 
as well, ruling that CADA was a neutral and generally applicable law.111 
On appeal, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision in its entirety and 
ordered Phillips to cease his discriminatory practices, adjust company policies, 
engage in comprehensive staff training on public accommodations, and 
compose quarterly compliance reports.112  In doing so, however, members of 
the Commission made several comments that called into question the 
Commission’s neutrality in adjudicating the matter.113  To illustrate, one of the 
commissioner’s comments is worth quoting at length:   
Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all 
kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be 
slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, 
we—we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of 
religion has been used to justify discrimination.  And to me it 
is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can 
 
106. Id. at 579. 
107. Id. at 577, 581.  
108. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1726 (2018). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1724, 1726.  
111. Id. at 1726.  For a discussion of generally and neutrally applicable laws à la Smith, see supra 
note 71–72 and accompanying text.  
112. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1726. 
113. Id. at 1723 (“[T]he Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s consideration of this case was 
inconsistent with the State’s obligation of religious neutrality.”).  
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use to—to use their religion to hurt others.114 
Despite this commentary, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Commission’s ruling and enforcement order,115 and the Colorado Supreme 
Court declined to hear the case.116  Faced with the decision to either abandon 
his twenty-four-year-old business or to comply with the enforcement order 
against his conscience, Phillips appealed.117 
In addressing Phillips’s claim to exemption, the United States Supreme 
Court majority garnered seven votes from the members of the Court—a 
surprising figure for how ideologically contentious the topic was.118  It soon 
became clear why there was such great consensus in light of the Court’s reason 
for disposing of the case.  
B. Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion: A Masterpiece of Simplicity 
The Court opened by juxtaposing the competing legal claims of the couple 
and of Phillips.  An extended excerpt from the opinion tees up the debate nicely 
and illustrates the Court’s operative legal analysis: 
The exercise of [gay persons’] freedom on terms equal to 
others must be given great weight and respect by the courts.  At 
the same time, the religious and philosophical objections to gay 
marriage are protected views and in some instances protected 
forms of expression . . . .  [W]hile those religious and 
philosophical objections are protected, it is a general rule that 
such objections do not allow business owners and other actors 
in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal 
access to goods and services under a neutral and generally 
applicable public accommodations law.119 
In issuing this latter maxim—viz., that business owners may not deny 
protected persons service—the Court’s case citation is critical to understanding 
the legal foundation undergirding the decision.  
 
114. Id. at 1729.  Also stated was that “Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to believe,’ but [he] 
cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in the state.’”  Id.  This statement 
unmistakably reifies the belief-action doctrine described in the foregoing. 
115. Id. at 1726–27. 
116. Id. at 1727.  
117. Id. at 1724, 1727. 
118. Id. at 1722.  
119. Id. at 1727. 
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To support its rationale, the Court cites Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 
Inc.,120 a Civil Rights Era case from the racial-anti-discrimination-law 
context.121  This is notable because, in that case, a restaurant owner, Maurice 
Bessinger, sought an exemption to a public accommodations law, arguing 
among other things that the law violated his free exercise rights.122  The Piggie 
Park Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of an exemption, holding that 
Bessinger could not justify his racial discrimination with a free exercise defense 
(among other defenses).123  
Piggie Park, however, is perhaps more notable for what the case has come 
to represent.  The Piggie Park Court, in its one page opinion, noted that 
Bessinger threw in a series of “patently frivolous” defenses in a desperate 
attempt to obtain exemption from public accommodations laws.124  Included in 
the litany of Bessinger’s claims were claims that the public accommodations 
laws imposed involuntary servitude on him, constituted a taking without just 
compensation, denied him equal protection, abridged his privileges and 
immunities, and violated his free exercise rights.125  “Patently frivolous” 
indeed.  Yet the Piggie Park Court did not engage in free exercise analysis 
whatsoever in addressing Bessinger’s singular (and farcical) religious 
objection.126  Instead, the Court disposed of the free exercise claim in a passing 
footnote, rightly observing that it was rooted in nothing more than malicious 
intent.127  Despite Piggie Park’s abbreviated and perfunctory analysis, the 
Masterpiece Court relied on Piggie Park as controlling precedent for sincerely-
held religious objections to same-sex marriage.128 
The Masterpiece Court reasoned that if a minister was asked to perform a 
wedding ceremony for a gay couple, then she could reasonably object on First 
Amendment grounds “without serious diminishment to [the gay persons’] 
dignity and worth.”129  However, if exceptions were not capped at the clergy, 
 
120. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
121. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
122. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 944 (D.S.C. 1966).  
123. Id. at 945.  
124. Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402 n.5. 
125. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Piggie Park, 390 U.S. 400 (No. 339), 1967 WL 129622, at *18. 
126. See generally Piggie Park, 390 U.S. 400. 
127. Id. at 402 n.4. 
128. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018). 
129. Id. 
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then a host of objectors might stigmatize gay people by declining to extend 
them goods and services.130  
This reasoning would typically be damning for a religious exemption 
seeker.  Nevertheless, the Court ruled in favor of Phillips, saying that “[t]he 
Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of [Phillips’s] case has some elements of 
a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that 
motivated his objection.”131  How did the Commission produce such prejudiced 
decision-making? 
Justice Kennedy submitted that the Commission’s hostility was 
exemplified in two distinct ways.  The first was facially apparent: a couple of 
the commissioners derided Phillips’s religious beliefs during a hearing.132  The 
Court took these statements, among others, to exude prejudice against 
religion.133  The Commission’s hostility was not just apparent through its 
remarks during public hearings, however.  The other instances of hostility 
require a bit of background.  
When Masterpiece was pending adjudication on the state level, a customer 
named William Jack requested three bakers to prepare cakes with messages 
disapproving same-sex marriage on religious grounds, along with religious 
texts to that effect.134  Upon the bakers’ refusal, the man filed claims of religious 
discrimination under CADA, the same Act under which Craig and Mullins filed 
their public accommodations complaint.135  However, when the Colorado Court 
of Appeals reviewed William Jack’s claims, it did not find any discrimination 
and issued a decision inconsistent with the Commission’s resolution of 
Phillips’s claim.136  The Court found inconsistency in the Commission’s 
determination that any message from Phillips’s cake design would be the 
couple’s message and not Phillips’s, whereas the messages from William Jack’s 
requested cakes would be messages for which the bakers would be 
responsible.137  
 
130. Id. at 1728–29.  Imagine, Kennedy urges, if signs were posted outside of businesses that 
read “no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for gay [persons].”  Id. at 1729. 
131. Id. 
132. See id.  
133. Id. at 1730. 
134. Id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
135. Id. at 1732–33. 
136. Id. at 1733. 
137. Id. at 1730. 
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The Court also perceived disparate treatment in the Commission’s finding 
that Phillips’s refusal was sexual-orientation discrimination, while the other 
three bakers’ refusals lacked religious discrimination.138  In a word, the 
Commission treated Phillips’s claims and the other three bakers’ claims 
inconsistently despite the protection that CADA extends to each customer.139  
Consequently, the Court inferred that “Phillips’s religious objection was not 
considered with the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires.”140  On 
these very narrow grounds, the Court disposed of the case, setting aside the 
Colorado Court of Appeals’ order.141  Despite the majority’s shallow Free 
Exercise Clause analysis, however, it did leave some clues as to its current 
jurisprudential posture. 
To begin with, by invoking Piggie Park to support its insistence that 
LGBTQ persons be granted equal access to goods and services, the Court 
displayed a trajectory toward viewing wedding-vendor cases through the lens 
of race-based public accommodations jurisprudence.142  Furthermore, although 
the Court did not suggest what type of balancing could be done in wedding-
vendor cases, the Court observed that “the State’s interest could have been 
weighed against Phillips’ sincere religious objections . . . .”143  Whether this 
would be a balancing test akin to Smith, Sherbert, or somewhere in between, 
the Court did not say in its elliptical conclusion.  Thus, the majority opened up 
the possibility that these seemingly incompatible claims could be legitimately 
weighed, but no categorical rule was advanced for resolving this collision of 
constitutional interests.  Finally, the Court urged “neutral” adjudication in all 
cases involving religious objections to public accommodations laws. 
C. The More Consequential Concurrences 
The deeper legal and philosophical reflection came from the concurring and 
dissenting opinions in Masterpiece.  Justice Kagan, for one, concurred in the 
judgment.144  Although she found animus in the Commission’s commentary 
along with the majority, she observed that, absent such animus, Piggie Park 




140. Id. at 1731. 
141. Id. at 1732. 
142. Id. at 1727. 
143. Id. at 1732. 
144. Id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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result.”145  In other words, Kagan suggested that civil-rights era public 
accommodations doctrine provides the correct rubric for analyzing wedding 
cases.146  Hence, Colorado can protect a gay person’s right to acquire goods and 
services free from discrimination—even religiously rooted discrimination.147  
Justice Kagan also wrote separately to clarify the distinction between the 
cakes sought from the three bakers and the cake sought from Phillips.148  She 
posited that the three bakers would have denied the cakes that William Jack 
requested to anyone; so the bakers did not single out William Jack on account 
of his religious identity.149  By contrast, the same-sex couple requested a 
wedding cake that Phillips would have prepared for an opposite-sex couple.150  
Therefore, Justice Kagan contended that the three bakers’ refusals were not 
discriminatory, but Phillips’s was.151  It is on this very point that Justice 
Gorsuch disagreed in his concurrence.152  
For Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kagan’s characterization of events overlooked 
a subtle yet imperative wrinkle.  Phillips would have offered baked goods to 
any couple celebrating any other occasion, Gorsuch argued.153  However, 
Phillips would not design a cake celebrating same-sex marriage for any person 
“regardless of his or her sexual orientation.”154  This, reasoned Gorsuch, was 
supported by Phillips’s refusal to sell the same cake to Craig’s mother.155  Under 
this narrative, Phillips and the three bakers alike declined to create cakes with 
messages that they found to be offensive.156  For Justice Gorsuch, then, the 
Commission’s vice was not in its offensive language directed at Phillips’s 
religious beliefs; it was in the inconsistent application of a legal rule.  
Justice Gorsuch also accused Justices Kagan and Ginsburg of following the 
same logical misstep as the Commission in distinguishing between Phillips and 
 
145. Id. at 1734 (emphasis in original). 
146. Id. at 1733–34.  
147. Id. at 1734.  
148. Id. at 1733–34. 
149. Id. at 1733. 
150. Id. 
151. Id.  
152. Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
153. Id. at 1735. 
154. Id. 
155. Id.  Following Phillips’s refusal to create a cake for Craig and Mullins, Craig’s mother 
requested a cake with the same content.  See id. at 1735. 
156. Id. 
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the other bakers.  He argued that, when distinguishing between the three bakers’ 
and Phillips’s cakes, they applied an unequal level of generality.157  That is, 
when discussing Phillips’s cake, Justices Kagan and Ginsburg conceived of it 
as the sum of its parts: sugar, butter, flour, and eggs.158  The cake conveyed no 
ascertainable message.159  Yet, when Justices Kagan and Ginsburg addressed 
the three bakers’ cakes, they described them as vehicles of identifiable, 
offensive messages.160  This error, asserted Justice Gorsuch, produced the same 
inequitable analysis that surfaced before the Commission.161  Therefore, for 
Justice Gorsuch, whatever rule governs the resolution of wedding-vendor cases, 
it should be applied equally to all protected classes. 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence takes a swift plunge into complex free 
speech jurisprudence.162  His message is simple though.  Wedding cakes are 
symbolic expressions, or speech; bakers create and customize those expressions 
through their artistic abilities; the First Amendment protects a person from 
being compelled to speak; so to compel Phillips to create a cake against his 
conscience is to abridge his freedom from compelled speech.163  Thus, just as 
compelling the LGBTQ group’s participation would cause sponsors to “alter 
the expressive content” of their message in Hurley, so too would Colorado’s 
public accommodations law force Phillips to convey a message with which he 
disagreed—specifically, that same-sex unions are “weddings” and ought to be 
celebrated as such.164  And even though the Colorado Court of Appeals 
suggested that Phillips could merely post a disclaimer to dissociate Masterpiece 
Inc. from endorsing same-sex marriages, that rationale could justify essentially 
any law that compels speech and lead to a parade of horribles.165  Neither is it 
the Court’s role to regulate speech just because a group finds that speech to be 
 
157. Id. at 1737–39. 
158. Id. at 1738. 
159. Id. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
160. Id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring), 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
161. Id. at 1738–39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
162. Id. at 1740–42 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“While Phillips rightly prevails on his free-
exercise claim, I write separately to address his free-speech claim.”).  Because this Article will largely 
dismiss the free speech approach to resolving these wedding-vendor cases, less attention will be 
devoted to Justice Thomas’s concurrence.  See supra Section III.B. 
163. Id. at 1740–44 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
164. Id. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of 
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995). 
165. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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stigmatizing, harmful, or offensive.166  Indeed, in Justice Thomas’s view, if 
speech is offensive or unorthodox, that is all the more reason to protect it.167  
Consequently, although Justice Thomas agreed with the thrust of the Court’s 
free exercise analysis, he wrote separately to advocate another angle by which 
similar cases could be resolved—free speech analysis. 
D. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by Justice Sotomayor, latches onto the 
majority’s public accommodations framework and develops it.168  Her public-
accommodations and dignitary-rights arguments, however, take the majority’s 
reasoning to its logical conclusion.169  Although Justice Ginsburg appreciated 
the majority’s public-accommodations analysis, she criticized the majority’s 
findings of hostility from the Colorado Commission.170  For Justice Ginsburg, 
it made little sense to find bias in the Commission’s disparate treatment of the 
three bakers’ cases and Phillips’s case.171  Indeed Phillips’s discrimination was 
rooted in the requesters’ identities, whereas the other bakers’ discrimination 
was rooted in the offensive content of a message.172  Hence, Justice Ginsburg 
asserted that, because the status of the person requesting the cake was material 
in weighing Phillips’s refusal only, the Court was remiss to treat all of the 
bakers’ refusals as legally equivalent.173 
To the free speech argument, Ginsburg observed that Phillips’s wedding 
cake would not have required words, while Jack’s anti-same-sex marriage cake 
would have.174  Moreover, Phillips rejected Craig and Mullins before he could 
 
166. Id. at 1746.  For a recent and similar case in this vein with particularly egregious facts, see 
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 443, 448 (2011) (protecting a group’s First Amendment right to say 
outrageously offensive things about gay people and U.S. soldiers at a military funeral).  There are also 
numerous cases to which Justice Thomas alludes that uphold free speech rights despite the excessively 
racist content of the speakers and the dignitary harm the content inflicted on the speakers.  Masterpiece, 
138 S. Ct. at 1746–47 (Thomas, J., concurring) (compiling a list of cases in which the Supreme Court 
upheld the speaker’s right to express racially offensive speech). 
167. Id. at 1747. 
168. Id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
169. Id. at 1751.  
170. Id. at 1748–49. 
171. Id. at 1750. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 1751.  
174. Id. at 1751 n.5. 
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even determine what message the couple wanted to convey in the first place.175  
For these reasons, the Commission and Court of Appeals were sensible to 
distinguish between the cases.176   
Finally, Justice Ginsburg argued that it made little sense to reverse the 
judgment below merely because of the derogatory comments of one or two 
commissioners.177  Not only did the “proceedings involve[] . . . layers of 
independent decisionmaking,” but the entire Commission also did not 
participate in the slanderous commentary of Phillips’s religious beliefs.178  
Therefore, because none of the Commission’s actions were substantially 
prejudicial and it did not act in a concertedly discriminatory manner, the Court 
was wrong to reverse the judgment below in Justice Ginsburg’s estimation. 
E. An Interpretive Gloss: Masterpiece Does Not Advance Religious Liberty 
A slew of commentary has followed the Masterpiece decision.179  
Numerous scholars and commentators have highlighted the negative impact the 
decision will have on the LGBTQ community.180  And other commentary has 
construed the decision as a narrow ruling about the requisite neutrality 




177. Id. at 1751. 
178. Id. 
179. See, e.g., Elizabeth Clark, And the Winner Is . . . Pluralism?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 6, 2018, 
11:36 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-and-the-winner-is-pluralism 
[https://perma.cc/V6TE-2HHF] (arguing that the Court did little to move the ball in the wedding-
vendor context).  
180. See, e.g., Jeremiah A. Ho, Queer Sacrifice in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 31 YALE J. L. & FEM. 
(forthcoming); Melissa Murray, Inverting Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the New Minorities, 
2018 SUP. CT. REV. 257, 297 (“[Masterpiece] gestured toward developing trends in antidiscrimination 
law—trends that are consistent with a broader trajectory in which powerful constituencies have been 
able to mobilize law to vindicate their interests, while marginalizing the interests of individuals and 
groups once deemed in need of the law’s protection.”); David Cole, This Takes the Cake, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS (July 19, 2018), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/07/19/civil-rights-this-takes-the-
cake/ [https://perma.cc/N9B7-2VTU] (arguing that the Court's finding of antireligious bias was 
strained and misplaced); House, supra note 12; Downs, supra note 12.  Alternatively, a number of 
commentators have also cast Masterpiece as a victory for religious freedom.  See, e.g., Richard F. 
Duncan, A Piece of Cake or Religious Expression: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the First Amendment, 
2018 NEB. L. REV. BULL. 10, 24 (“The Court did rule in favor of Mr. Phillips’s free exercise claim in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, and. . . . pave[d] a significant path for religious liberty claims going forward.”). 
181. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Worst Form of Judicial Minimalism—Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Deserved a Full Vindication for Its Claims of Religious Liberty and Free Speech, 
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commentary, however, underestimates the potential significance of the decision 
if its rationale is extended and applied to future wedding-vendor cases.  
This Part posits that Masterpiece is not as narrow or in favor of religious 
liberty as most acknowledge.  To be sure, any guess at the trajectory the Court 
will follow in future wedding-vendor cases would be speculative.  The 
composition of the Court is different now than it was before, and further 
wedding-vendor litigation has refined several legal issues.182  However, if the 
Court continues on its current path, applying its current doctrine, Masterpiece 
should be perceived as neither a win for religious-liberty advocates nor a loss 
for LGBTQ-rights advocates.   
The Court provided more doctrinal guidance in Masterpiece than meets the 
eye.  If this guidance has any bearing on future wedding cases, free exercise 
jurisprudence can be expected to be watered down further in the future, and 
LGBTQ rights can be expected to be protected more vigorously.  There are 
positives and negatives inherent to this trend, but this Part merely adds an 
interpretive gloss for better understanding Masterpiece. 
1. What Kind of Precedent Did Masterpiece Set? 
Any degree of certainty concerning the doctrinal significance of 
Masterpiece would be too certain.  It is an opinion rife with ambiguous and 
capacious potential.  One thing does seem clear in Masterpiece though: it favors 
the LGBTQ community.  This is primarily due to the relationship that 
Masterpiece creates between public-accommodations doctrine and religious 
exemptions.  
Debates have surfaced over the past few decades—and especially over the 
past few years—about whether race and sexual orientation can or should be 
treated differently for the purposes of public accommodations regimes.183  For 
 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 4, 2018, 8:29 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-the-worst-
form-of-judicial-minimalism-masterpiece-cakeshop-deserved-a-full-vindication-for-its-claims-of-
religious-liberty-and-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/BVF7-U8VE] (highlighting the decision’s 
narrowness and criticizing the decision for the implications this narrowness will bear). 
182. See generally Adam Liptak & Noah Weiland, Justice Kavanaugh Takes the Bench on the 
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/us/politics/justice-
brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/VD6A-KKRA] (discussing the recent addition 
of Justice Kavanaugh and its possible implications). 
183. Compare Darren Lenard Hutchinson, ‘Gay Rights’ for ‘Gay Whites’?: Race, Sexual 
Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1361–62 (2000) (arguing against 
the analogizing of sexual identity and racial identity), with Mark L. Rienzi, Substantive Due Process 
as a Two-Way Street: How the Court Can Reconcile Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 68 
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some protected classes, the relationship between religious exemptions and anti-
discrimination law has materialized: No religious exemptions have been 
granted for race-based public accommodations laws, but a number of laws 
implicating women’s health have been granted religious exemptions.184  And 
when the Court has addressed sexual orientation in other arenas, exemptions 
have been granted to public accommodations laws for the sake of other 
important constitutional interests.185  Therefore, given the unsure footing on 
which Smith has placed the Free Exercise Clause, the question of religious 
exemptions vis-à-vis public accommodations laws has left commentators 
pondering the level of scrutiny that will apply to anti-discrimination laws 
protecting sexual orientation.186 
In Masterpiece, the Court showed its cards by invoking Piggie Park to 
substantiate the assertion that “[religious] objections do not allow business 
owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons 
equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable 
public accommodations law.”187  This language is striking for two reasons.  To 
start with, the Piggie Park Court refused to grant a religious exemption to race-
based anti-discrimination laws despite the strict-scrutiny protection free 
exercise interests enjoyed at the time.188  By invoking precedent from the 
context of race, the Masterpiece majority indicated that public accommodations 
laws concerning sexual orientation would be analyzed through the prism of 
their race-based counterparts.  Such an approach, even amid heightened 
protection for sincere religious objection, will often render a finding that the 
 
STAN. L. REV. 18, 19–20 (2015) (analogizing the law’s treatment of various modes of discrimination 
and arguing that they can contribute to each other’s doctrinal development). 
184. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 689–91 (2014) (granting the 
plaintiffs an exemption from the ACA’s requirement that employee-based health care plans provide 
contraception coverage under the auspices of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA).  For an argument 
about the negative impact of these religious exemptions to sex-based accommodations, see Douglas 
NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and 
Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2539–43 (2015). 
185. See supra notes 103–07 (granting an exemption to a public accommodations law protecting 
sexual orientation on the basis of free speech). 
186. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 654–57 (2016) (discussing the various public accommodations laws and 
drawing attention to the uncertainty in the treatment of public accommodations geared toward LGBTQ 
people). 
187. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018). 
188. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing the Piggie Park holding).  
Furthermore, Piggie Park was decided before Smith, under the more rigorous Sherbert standard. 
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government’s heightened interest in ensuring equal access to goods in the 
marketplace trumps.189  Accordingly, while the Court’s dicta seems to place 
free exercise interests and dignitary interests in equipoise, its invocation of 
Piggie Park is telling.  
Equally telling is the majority’s sparse treatment of free exercise doctrine 
in Masterpiece.190  As the foregoing outlined, free exercise doctrine is on 
precarious ground.191  It is difficult to ascertain any clear or unified standard for 
free exercise rights and, as Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence notes, “Smith 
remains controversial in many quarters.”192  The Court, however, did not seize 
upon the opportunity to overturn, or even clarify, Employment Division v. 
Smith, as some might have hoped.193  In fact, the Court did not even cite Smith 
as controlling precedent throughout its entire opinion even though Masterpiece 
clearly involved religious practice.194  Thus, little was done to elucidate free 
exercise jurisprudence despite ample opportunity.195  Coupled with the 
implementation of Piggie Park as guiding precedent, this dearth of free exercise 
development would seem to suggest that the Court finds public 
accommodations laws like CADA to qualify as the generally applicable and 
neutral laws that Smith permits.  And since the Smith Court disregarded 
incidental burdens on religion, if Smith stands as good law, that places public 
accommodations laws concerning sexual orientation in the clear.196 
 
189. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 582, 605 (1983) (refusing the 
university’s tax-exempt status due to a racist school policy despite free exercise claims).  Although not 
a public accommodations case, Bob Jones falls in line with several anti-discrimination cases that 
maintain the government’s compelling interest in protecting racial minorities. 
190. See Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1751 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Phillips’s case is thus far 
removed from the only precedent upon which the Court relies, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
Hialeah. . . .”). 
191. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; Brief of Christian Legal Society et al., supra 
note 91, at 6 (arguing that Smith’s rule is unclear and uncertain and therefore warrants direct treatment). 
192. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
193. See Brief of Christian Legal Society et al., supra note 91, at 6 (“[The Court] should order 
briefing to reconsider the rule of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  That rule will 
have failed to secure religious liberty if it affords no protection here. . . .”). 
194. Interestingly (though unsurprisingly), the Court does cite Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015) several times.  Although Justice Kennedy authored that opinion, such consultations of 
precedent might further indicate the Court’s leaning in wedding-vendor cases. 
195. That said, echoes of Smith do appear throughout the opinion.  See, e.g., Masterpiece, 138 
S. Ct. at 1727 (emphasis added) (“[Religious persons cannot] deny protected persons equal access to 
goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.”). 
196. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 875 (1990). 
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In short, amid dubious speculations and misguided certainty—about the 
subsistence of the Court’s public accommodations jurisprudence for the 
category of sexual orientation as well as the weight ascribed to free exercise 
interests—Masterpiece preserves the public-accommodations template as a live 
(if not preferable) option.  In citing Piggie Park as controlling precedent and 
refraining from addressing Smith altogether, the Court indicated that the legal 
standard from race-based public accommodations law will extend with equal 
force to LGBTQ people when they are statutorily protected.  For these reasons, 
interpretations that hold out Masterpiece as favoring religious liberty will be 
remiss when extrapolating the Court’s doctrinal vector in future wedding-
vendor cases. 
IV. THE DESCRIPTIVE TASK: ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF MASTERPIECE 
CAKESHOP 
Now that a corrective lens has been added to the more sanguine visions of 
Masterpiece’s precedential status, this Part offers a critique of Masterpiece and 
the doctrinal legacy bound to spill into future wedding-vendor litigation.  To 
this end, this Part will begin by criticizing the Court’s analogy to the racial-
discrimination context.  It will then proceed by arguing that, notwithstanding 
the robust invocation of free speech doctrine in wedding-vendor cases, the Free 
Exercise Clause provides for a more fitting arena for the resolution of these 
cases.  Not only is this because the free speech axis tends to muddle legal 
analysis by presenting intractable line-drawing issues, but it is also because 
wedding-vendor cases present fundamentally religious issues that should be 
addressed as such.   
Next, this Part argues that Masterpiece’s disposal of the case on grounds of 
hostility risks enervating both free-exercise and anti-discrimination values.  
And finally, in light of the weighty importance of LGBTQ rights and free 
exercise rights, an analysis that merely highlighted the weaknesses of the 
Court’s doctrine would be incomplete.  Accordingly, the subsequent Part 
advances a template for analyzing and resolving wedding-vendor cases.  Its 
primary concern is to initiate a broader conversation about the issues actually 
at stake in wedding-vendor cases and to suggest possibilities for a middle 
ground between the zero-sum, all-or-nothing logic under which these cases and 
controversies have been understood.  
A. The Piggie Park Precedent: Why the Analogy Breaks Down 
Doctrinally, the Court’s analysis is not entirely unavailing.  For example, it 
does well at teeing up the issues at stake in wedding-vendor cases and expresses 
ROGERS_FINAL_25NOV19 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2019  7:12 AM 
2019] A MASTERPIECE OF SIMPLICITY 193 
 
 
a commitment to honoring the interests of all parties involved, however 
incommensurable they might seem.  Furthermore, the majority does important 
work by reminding us that we are not living in a post-discriminatory society 
simply because Obergefell was handed down a few years ago.  America is no 
more post-homophobic than it is post-racist.  So the majority is right to insist 
that “gay persons and gay couples . . . be treated . . . [with equal] dignity and 
worth.”197  Yet racial-discrimination precedent misfires in the context of 
wedding-vendor cases, leaving Masterpiece’s gesture toward this approach 
inapposite.  The most obvious example of this weakness is in the Court’s 
application of Piggie Park.  
In Piggie Park, the respondent—which made no appearance before the 
Court—dumped into its initial pleadings a series of “patently frivolous” 
defenses, all in a last-ditch effort to seek exemptions that would allow the 
restaurant to continue discriminating against people of color.198  The Court, in 
its barely-one-page opinion about attorney’s fees, swiftly dismissed these 
claims in a passing footnote.199  Of course, the Piggie Park Court was right to 
summarily deny Piggie Park’s defenses and to award attorney’s fees to the 
challengers.  But the case did not create a suitable public-accommodations 
precedent for instances in which religious beliefs are sincerely held, as is often 
the case for wedding vendors.200  Indeed the Court plainly stated that 
Bessinger’s defenses were made in bad faith.201  For this reason, the Court did 
not provide a searching analysis with apt application to cases involving 
important constitutional values and genuine faith convictions.  Thus, 
Masterpiece’s reliance on Piggie Park is conceptually troubling.  
The Court’s reliance also tends to conflate the distinctive types of, and 
reasons for, people’s discriminatory practices.  In Piggie Park, for instance, 
Bessinger sought exemptions for the purpose of excluding and harming African 
Americans.202  Exclusion was his chief aim.  And his objection to the public 
accommodations laws was rooted in animus, even if it was otherwise guised as 
 
197. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
198. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402–03 n.5 (1968).  Perhaps the most 
ludicrous defense was that the public accommodations law forced Bessinger into involuntary servitude.  
For the full list of defenses, see supra note 125 and accompanying text.  
199. Id. at 402 n.4.  Included in this dismissal was a reference to the free exercise challenge. 
200. See, e.g., supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
201. Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402–03 nn.4–5. 
202. Id. at 402 n.4. 
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being rooted in moral conviction.203  By contrast, in the typical wedding-vendor 
case, the objector’s religious beliefs are sincerely held and are rooted in 
longstanding religious traditions.204  They are not wielded for the purposes of 
harming the person who is denied goods or services.  Rather, religious 
objections are intended to preserve the believer’s conscience, and any incidental 
dignitary harms flow forth as a consequence.205  This distinction is illustrated 
through a cursory glance at the factual distinctions between the two contexts.  
In Piggie Park, the store owner did not permit black people to eat on the 
premises of the restaurant at all for the purposes of protecting racist, non-
religious beliefs—a practice that was commonplace during the Civil Rights 
Movement and before.206  With wedding vendors, however, business owners 
typically refuse only those goods and services that celebrate same-sex 
marriage.207  They would typically be happy and willing to bake goods, arrange 
flowers, or take photos for other occasions—so long as they do not involve a 
symbolic celebration of same-sex marriage.208  Thus, the animating rationales 
behind the refusals are fundamentally different.  Therefore, to analogize and 
extend Piggie Park to the wedding-vendor context is to overlook material 
differences between the sincerity and motive behind the religious objections 
mounted in these divergent contexts. 
The failure to distinguish between both types of refusals points to a related 
problem with the invocation of Piggie Park for wedding-vendor cases: To treat 
LGBTQ rights as co-extensive with, and qualitatively equivalent to, race-based 
rights is to underestimate the nuances between those excluded.  Social context 
matters.  Doubly so for discrimination claims.  And the social context that gave 
rise to anti-discrimination laws during the Civil Rights Era is vastly different 




204. See, e.g., supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
205. Ryan T. Anderson, Disagreement Is Not Always Discrimination: On Masterpiece Cakeshop 
and the Analogy to Interracial Marriage, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 123, 138 (2018) (describing the 
typical intent in wedding-vendor cases and the material difference between these types of cases and 
those presented in the context of race-based discrimination). 
206. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 947 (D.S.C. 1966), rev’d, 377 F.2d 
433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).  
207. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
208. Id. 
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Indeed, around the time Piggie Park was decided, explicit discrimination 
pervaded public accommodations, leaving black travelers without access to 
basic human needs, “including food, shelter, bathrooms, and fuel.”209  This led 
to the publication of The Negro Motorist Green Book, which informed black 
travelers where they could receive the basic goods that are necessary to human 
life.210  The Green Book is a testament to the extensive and comprehensive 
discrimination that black people faced during the Civil Rights Era, as well as 
its rootedness in racism and the badges of slavery.211  And this backdrop led to 
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including its public 
accommodations provisions.212  It also led to the analysis of racially 
discriminatory laws under a strict scrutiny standard of review.213  And it is in 
this context that Piggie Park was handed down.  
This is not to undermine the struggle of the LGBTQ community.  The 
LGBTQ community has experienced bigotry and discrimination in the United 
States for centuries, and it still does.214  And just like other forms of injustice, 
our communities must fight against it.215  But the LGBTQ struggle is a struggle 
 
209. Joseph William Singer, We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the 
Mark of Sodom, 95 B. U. L. REV. 929, 935 (2015). 
210. VICTOR H. GREEN & CO., THE NEGRO MOTORIST GREEN BOOK: A TRAVEL GUIDE 1 
(1949). 
211. See Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in Support 
of Appellees at 2, Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015) (No. 
2014CA1351) (“African Americans were relegated to second-class citizenship by a system of laws, 
ordinances, and customs that segregated white and African-American people in every possible area of 
life, including places of public accommodation.  This system of segregation was designed to prevent 
African Americans from breaking the racial hierarchy established during slavery.”); see also Nancy 
Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform 
Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1277–82 (2017) (describing the extensive discrimination against 
African Americans during the Jim Crow Era). 
212. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012) (prohibiting race discrimination in public accommodations, 
including “lodgings; facilities principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises; 
gasoline stations; places of exhibition or entertainment; other covered establishments.”).  For a rich 
account of the overall political and religious climate during this era, see MARK A. NOLL, GOD AND 
RACE IN AMERICAN POLITICS: A SHORT HISTORY 152–64 (2008) (discussing the political fracturing 
and realignment that characterized the Civil Rights Movement). 
213. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1966). 
214. For an account of the widespread mistreatment of LGBTQ persons within the US, see 
Singer, supra note 209, at 933, 943, 946. 
215. This is not to suggest that unjust discrimination should always be combatted through anti-
discrimination laws. 
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sui generis, and it should be treated as such.216  To be sure, various types of 
legal developments and social movements have built upon and borrowed from 
each other, and that is a good thing.217  But numerous commentators—on the 
right, left, and everywhere in between—have pointed to the harm caused by the 
tendency to over-familiarize the struggle of African-Americans with the 
struggle of people within LGBTQ community.218  
Unless courts, commissioners, and commentators acknowledge the reality 
of these distinctive social contexts, claims like those of Phillips or claims like 
those of Craig and Mullins will not be taken seriously enough.  Conservatives 
will downplay as histrionic the claims of LGBTQ persons and will fail to realize 
the dignitary harm inflicted upon them; liberals will disregard the defenses of 
religious objectors as bigoted antipathy—akin to that of racism—and fail to 
grasp the sincerity of the objectors’ religious convictions and their 
entrenchment within religious traditions.219 
Additionally, a public-accommodations template taken from the context of 
race will render different results for religious objectors.  Within the context of 
race, free exercise challenges to discrimination seem to give way to the 
government’s compelling interest in protecting vulnerable groups and 
redressing the badges and incidents of slavery.220  For example, when Bob Jones 
University claimed a right to tax-exemption status because its racial 
discrimination was rooted in so-called free exercise values, the Court agreed 
with the Internal Revenue Service’s refusal of the University’s claims.221  
Also, because expressing racism and excluding people on the basis of their 
skin pigmentation is typically not a central component of practicing religion, 
the religious objector is largely unaffected when anti-discrimination policies 
 
216. See generally Hutchinson, supra note 183 (applying critical race theory to argue that sexual 
identity and racial identity should be treated as unique and discrete identities for the sake of civil rights). 
217. See Rienzi, supra note 183, at 23.  
218. Compare Hutchinson, supra note 183, 1375–78 (applying critical race theory to suggest 
that the analogy can bring harm to people of color, especially those who are situated within the LGBTQ 
community), with Anderson, supra note 205, at 124 (arguing from a conservative perspective that 
racial discrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination present two distinct phenomena). 
219. See Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt From Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. 
L. REV. 781, 844 (2007) (arguing that the virtue of humility needs to take precedence in this delicate 
area of law so that the complex interests at stake will be adequately acknowledged). 
220. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (prizing race in the Court’s calculus 
despite competing constitutional values). 
221. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580, 605 (1982) (affirming the IRS’s ruling 
that a private school’s tax-exempt status was contingent upon its rescission of discriminatory policies).  
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are enforced and, consequently, unlikely to cause political upheaval.  Bob 
Jones, for one, immediately changed its discriminatory policy upon rejection of 
tax-exempt status.222  This is largely because racial discrimination did not 
represent a matter of importance to the objector’s religious tradition, but a latent 
socio-political conviction.223  By contrast, when other civil rights laws threaten 
values and practices central to a religious tradition, the backlash has the 
potential to be much more severe.224  The community in Yoder, for instance, 
was ready to emigrate if the Court did not grant its education exemption.225  
Because the LGBTQ-rights discussion occupies a more central place of 
importance for many religious communities, a categorical refusal to grant even 
a narrow exemption would likely foment hostility, “undermine initial reforms, 
erode public support for the government that was pursuing the reform, and 
further mobilize reactionary forces with even broader agendas for 
retrenchment.”226  As Professor Minow observes: 
When subcommunities clashed with the emerging national 
rejection of racial discrimination, the subcommunities lost, and 
perhaps in decades hence, a similar story will be told about 
gender and sexual orientation discrimination.  Yet perhaps 
because they pertain to rules and practices that lie close to the 
heart of many religions, gender and sexual orientation practices 
of religious communities do not summon the same confident 
national rejection.  Instead, clashes between these practices and 
antidiscrimination ideas invite the reminder that religious 
freedom is itself a civil right, demanding federal recognition 
and protection.227 
 
222. Bob Jones University Ends Ban on Interracial Dating, CNN (Mar. 4, 2000), 
http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/03/04/bob.jones/index.html [https://perma.cc/HJ3R-AU2Y]. 
223. See Minow, supra note 219, at 827 (arguing that in Bob Jones, the Court thought that “the 
willingness of Bob Jones University ultimately to adapt to the public rule, and end exclusion of 
African-Americans from admission, gives a clue that its racial exclusion policy was not central to its 
mission.”); Bob Jones University Ends Ban on Interracial Dating, supra note 222 (internal quotations 
omitted) (“‘[A]s of today, we have dropped the rule. . . .  [T]he policy is meaningless to us.  Our 
concern for the school’s broader usefulness is greater to us than a rule we never talk about . . . .  We 
can’t back it up with a verse in the Bible.”). 
224. See Minow, supra note 219, at 825 (“[R]ival views, rooted in texts, shared histories, and 
collective narratives, provide vital meaning and value in people’s lives.”). 
225. For a discussion of Yoder’s threat to leave, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 
(1972). 
226. See Minow, supra note 219, at 824. 
227. Id. at 825–26. 
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In short, if race-based protections had trumped a sincere religious belief in 
Piggie Park, constitutional law would have been left the better.  This would 
have clarified free-exercise and public-accommodations doctrine, the weight 
that courts must ascribe to race and religion, and the importance of squelching 
racially discriminatory conduct—religiously motivated or otherwise.  But 
Piggie Park addressed religious assertions that were patently insincere and, 
therefore, patently inapt for the modern milieu of wedding-vendor cases. 
Courts frequently analogize to other contexts and doctrines in formulating 
their own, which is not, of course, bad per se.228  Still, the Masterpiece Court 
was mistaken to modulate the issues at stake in Masterpiece through the 
narrative of race.  That measure tends to diminish material differences between 
the contexts of race and sexual orientation—each of which calls for different 
analysis—and it underestimates the disparate impact that legal standards will 
have in these distinctive contexts.  Consequently, the Masterpiece Court opened 
a breach by appealing to Piggie Park and analogizing to the race-based context.  
Future litigants are therefore invited to go “[o]nce more unto the 
breach . . . [and] [d]isguise fair nature with hard-favour’d rage” as their values 
clash in future disputes.229  
B. The Stilted Free Speech Angle 
In its treatment of free speech, Masterpiece is, in a sense, doctrinally 
elegant.  The compelled speech issue volleyed among the majority, 
concurrences, and dissent displays sophisticated legal analysis.  And these 
opinions draw attention to the tension caused when civil rights are not respected 
or interpreted with charity.  None of these strengths should be overlooked.  Yet, 
while the free speech angle elicits all of these virtues, it does so at the expense 
of squarely addressing the legal issues at stake in wedding-vendor cases.  This 
will have adverse legal and practical implications on lower courts and litigants. 
For Phillips, his free speech claim occupied a substantial portion of his 
argument.230  In response, the Court spilled much more ink over Phillips’s free 
 
228. See Rienzi, supra note 183, at 19–20 (highlighting the usefulness of diverse identities 
borrowing from each other’s methods). 
229. William Shakespeare, King Henry the Fifth, act 3, sc. 1.  For a list of some of these litigants, 
see supra note 90. 
230. See Appellees’ Amended Answer Brief at 11-23, Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 
P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015) (No. 14CA1351).  
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speech claims than his free exercise claims.231  And other litigants seem to have 
caught on to arguing along these lines.232  Indeed, all wedding-vendor cases 
percolating throughout the lower courts elevate the free speech axis, be it in the 
parties’ briefings or the courts’ analyses.233  Legal scholars, too, seemed to have 
followed suit in their commentary on Masterpiece, encouraging resolution of 
wedding-vendor cases according to free speech principles.234  That said, an 
over-reliance on free speech doctrine poses practical problems for wedding 
vendors and doctrinal problems for free exercise jurisprudence. 
Several commentators have highlighted the disparate treatment that the 
Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause receive by courts.235  This 
disparate treatment has altered the litigation strategy employed by religious 
objectors: free exercise arguments have become eclipsed by free speech 
arguments, and free expression has begun to occupy a dominant place in 
wedding-vendor litigation.236  Is there a problem with this trend?  After all, the 
free speech angle universalizes legal issues in a way that the religious angle 
does not.  Almost everyone speaks, and they are entitled to do so in a reasonably 
 
231. Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728 
(2018), and id. at 1740–42 (Thomas, J., concurring), with id. at 1731, and id. at 1737 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
232. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
233. Id.; see, e.g., Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426, 436–40 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2018) (occupying the dominant portion of the opinion with free speech analysis, and compiling 
cases that do the same).  Free speech was also critical to the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling on appeal. 
See Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 902–07 (Ariz. 2019) (using free speech 
doctrine to drive the analysis).  This wedding-vendor case is a paradigmatic example of the over-
reliance of courts on free speech jurisprudence. 
234. Douglas Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, We’re Lawyers Who Support Same-Sex Marriage. 
We Also Support the Masterpiece Cakeshop Baker, VOX (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2017/12/6/16741602/masterpiece-cakeshop-same-sex-wedding [https://perma.cc/5H5W-XP9R] 
(noting that “[m]ost of the commentary on the case has focused on Phillips’s free speech claim.”). 
235. See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: 
Why Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
431, 477 (2006) (arguing that free speech claims lend themselves to more favorable treatment in 
pluralist democracies); Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial 
Treatment of Free Speech and Religious Exercise Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 361–63 
(2004) (highlighting the doctrinal disparity between the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech 
Clause, which is wrought by the self-reinforcing success of Free Speech Clause arguments in 
litigation). 
236. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; Garry, supra note 235, at 384 (arguing that free 
expression has come to dominate litigation tactics). 
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unfettered way in the United States—even through expressive conduct.237  But 
not everyone is religious.  If religious objectors ultimately seek protection for 
the same conduct, then, is the avenue through which protection is sought of 
consequence?  
Wedding cases should not be resolved on the free speech front for a couple 
related reasons.  The first is that the free speech approach presents severe 
definitional and line-drawing problems; the second is that reliance on the Free 
Speech Clause saps the Free Exercise Clause of its vitality and viability as a 
constitutional guarantee.  
1. Line-Drawing and Definitional Problems 
Constitutional jurisprudence has radically expanded what constitutes 
expressive conduct.  As one amicus brief, prepared for Masterpiece on behalf 
of First Amendment scholars, observed: virtually “every human activity can be 
cast as expressive in some way; [and] nearly every conduct-regulating law will 
have some incidental effect on human activity.”238  If almost every instance of 
conduct can be construed as speech, however, arbitrary line-drawing will 
become inherent to any legal analysis that hangs its hat on the “expressive 
conduct” hook.  This line-drawing has the potential to be both over-inclusive 
and under-inclusive for the conduct of wedding vendors.239  Justice Kagan’s 
inquest during oral argument for Masterpiece illustrates this nettlesome 
tendency.240 
In answering what constitutes “speech,” Phillips’s counsel stated that if a 
wedding product is “custom-designed” or requires “artistic expression” then the 
Court’s compelled speech doctrine protects a baker’s refusal to create a same-
sex wedding cake.241  Justice Kagan and Justice Ginsburg accordingly trudged 
through a litany of wedding vendors and activities to see who else would qualify 
 
237. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411, 415 (1974) (holding that for expressive conduct 
to be protected by the First Amendment, it must be intended to communicate a particularized message, 
and the attendant circumstances must suggest a strong likelihood that “the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it”). 
238. Brief of Floyd Abrams et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
239. The line-drawing concomitant to defining expressive conduct would be overinclusive if it 
protected conduct that was otherwise motivated by animus, and underinclusive if it failed to protect 
conduct that did not pass the expressive conduct test and left the religious claimant with no robust 
protection. 
240. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–14, Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
241. Id. at 11–12, 14. 
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as exhibiting “speech” under Phillips’s expansive theory of the First 
Amendment: “[T]he person who designs the invitation? . . .  The invitation to 
the wedding or the menu for the wedding dinner? . . .  [T]he jeweler? . . .  The 
hairstylist? . . .  The makeup artist? . . .  [T]he chef, the baker, the 
florist . . . ? . . .  [W]here would you put [the] tailor ?”242  To all of these 
questions, counsel responded differently—fumbling through answers that 
ranged from “yes” to “absolutely not.”243  The list continued, and counsel’s 
responses to Justice Kagan’s inquest exposed the muddled nature of utilizing 
free speech protection to resolve wedding cases.244  Justice Kagan best 
explained the risk of centralizing the free speech paradigm herself:  
I’m quite serious, actually, about this, because, you know, a 
makeup artist . . . might feel exactly as your client 
does. . . .  And why wouldn’t that person or the 
hairstylist . . . also count?  [Y]ou have a view that a cake can 
be speech because it . . . involves great skill and artistry.  And 
I guess I’m wondering, if that’s the case, . . . how do you draw 
a line?245 
As Masterpiece’s oral arguments exposed, the free speech approach raises 
serious definitional and line-drawing issues.  This approach might fail to protect 
makeup artists or photographers who object on religious grounds to rendering 
their services at same-sex weddings, but protect bakers or florists.246  These 
issues, endemic to the expressive conduct approach, will only multiply 
themselves when bandied around the lower courts. 
2. Free Speech Arguments Dwarf the Free Exercise Clause for Wedding 
Vendors 
The disproportionate emphasis on free speech is not just a typological error, 
mischaracterizing as speech what should otherwise be classified as religious 
exercise.  No, “[t]he disparity . . . between speech and religious liberty cases 
has produced . . . a constitutional imbalance . . . [as well as] a constitutional 
 
242. Id. at 11–17.  Justice Alito even chimed in, asking whether “architectural design” is 
deserving of free-speech protection.  Id. at 17. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 12–17.  
245. Id. at 13–14. 
246. For an analysis of religious practices that do not entail a communicative aspect, see 
generally David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL 
L. REV. 769, 773–74 (1991) (discussing passive religious observances through an examination of 
Native American religion). 
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distortion . . . .”247  Because the “courts have been far more inconsistent” with 
religious liberty, litigants have been reticent to seek legal protection for 
religious issues through the Free Exercise Clause.248  And by way of contrast, 
because courts have tended to be consistent and favorable with free expression, 
“First Amendment doctrines encourage litigants to classify every type of 
religious activity as speech, in the hope of obtaining a higher scrutiny of 
governmental activity.”249  The consequence is that the Free Speech Clause is 
doing more work than it should be in constitutional law—own largely to its 
rhetorical force and legal momentum—while “the Free Exercise Clause is 
becoming increasingly emptied.”250 
This doctrinal trend has created a self-perpetuating cycle whereby litigants 
are attracted to bringing free speech claims because they receive better results, 
which, in turn, helps to further develop and bolster First Amendment speech 
doctrine.251  Practically, this cycle tends to protect religious practices only to 
the extent that they fall within the ambit of the Free Speech Clause; it thereby 
discourages, “obscure[s], or even undermin[es]” the employment of the 
enumerated guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause for religious purposes.252  
Yet these are the precise guarantees and doctrines that need development and 
clarification, especially in light of the Free Exercise Clause’s uncertainty and 
underdevelopment after Smith.253  Consequently, commentators rightly point to 
the need to apply relevant constitutional provisions to legal issues that strike at 
the heart of an enumerated guarantee.254  
This need is acutely pressing for wedding vendors.  The free speech angle 
distracts from the crux of what is at stake in wedding-vendor cases.  Weddings, 
 
247. Garry, supra note 235, at 363.  
248. Id. at 362–63.  
249. Id. at 372. 
250. Id. at 363.  
251. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration 
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1795–99 (2004) (discussing the feedback loop 
by which First Amendment speech doctrine gains persuasive and authoritative force by subsuming 
tangential legal issues into itself). 
252. Garry, supra note 235, at 388–89. 
253. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text. 
254. See, e.g., Luke Morgan, Note, Leave Your Guns at Home: The Constitutionality of a 
Prohibition on Carrying Firearms at Political Demonstrations, 68 DUKE L.J. 175, 190 (2018) 
(discussing the need to “avoid the temptation to analyze conduct under the Free Speech Clause” if a 
constitutional provision is on point). 
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for better or worse, are religiously inflected events for many people.255  And the 
reservations that religious objectors have toward serving LGBTQ weddings are 
religiously founded.256  To deal with the legal issues squarely, then, the Court 
should determine if it is proper to grant any type of exemption to public 
accommodations laws on free exercise grounds.  Religious objectors are not 
primarily concerned with their speech as wedding vendors; they are concerned 
with their religious liberty and their consciences.  Accordingly, the Free 
Exercise Clause should serve as the normative constitutional axis for wedding-
vendor cases.  Resolving wedding-vendor cases on free speech grounds is to 
apply a secular solution to a fundamentally religious problem.   
Because the lower courts lack guidance on the scope and weight of the Free 
Exercise Clause after Smith,257 the Masterpiece Court should have clarified its 
contours.  This would have been better for both the religious objector and the 
LGBTQ community.  The Court’s direct treatment of the free exercise issues 
would have elucidated what beliefs and practices the Court was willing to 
protect and, hence, what conduct society, and the LGBTQ community, would 
be expected to tolerate to preserve religious convictions concerning marriage. 
These questions, and others, get overlooked when courts and commentators 
quibble about whether cake is speech.258  
So the majority was right to deal with this issue briefly and episodically.  
But instead of ensuring that the Free Exercise Clause would be the locus of 
legal analysis, the Masterpiece Court reinforced the likelihood that wedding-
vendor cases would be resolved according to free speech principles.259  That is 
not to say that free speech rights cannot implicate free exercise rights, and vice 
 
255. The Church and Civil Marriage, FIRST THINGS (Apr. 2014), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2014/04/the-church-and-civil-marriage [https://perma.cc/L89M-
JCMM]; J.D. Flynn, The Civil Marriage Business, FIRST THINGS (June 9, 2017), 
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2017/06/the-civil-marriage-business 
[https://perma.cc/WTU5-VY8W]. 
256. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1721 
(2018); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). 
257. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
258. See, e.g., Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring); Caroline Mala Corbin, 
Speech or Conduct? The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY. L.J. 241, 257–74 (2015) 
(addressing extensively whether cake designing constitutes speech). 
259. See supra notes 111–23 and accompanying text; see also Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City 
of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 902–07 (Ariz. 2019).  The only instance in which the free speech claim is 
preferable for wedding cases is in positing Justice Scalia’s convoluted hybrid rights doctrine from 
Smith. And as argued in the foregoing, that is not a desirable alternative.  For a discussion of the hybrid 
rights doctrine, see supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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versa.260  But not all “speech” should speak for the First Amendment, especially 
not in wedding-vendor cases wherein an adequate and enumerated guarantee is 
directly on point.  To keep the Free Exercise Clause from becoming a secondary 
constitutional guarantee—or worse, a dead letter from a bygone era—free 
speech analysis should not control wedding-vendor cases. 
C. Hostility as a Dispositive Free-Exercise Norm 
Some commentators have speculated that the Court’s charge that 
commissioners grant “neutral and respectful consideration”261 when resolving 
wedding cases will spark an expansion of religious exemptions to anti-
discrimination laws.262  But these views tend to conflate the narrow outcome of 
Masterpiece with its operative legal doctrine, which does different work.  The 
holding in Masterpiece, in essence, can be distilled as: “Do not be a bigot when 
administering public accommodations laws.”263  So if anything, by disposing of 
the case on the grounds of the commissioner’s hostile statements, the Court 
encouraged adjudicatory bodies to force their discriminatory ideas 
underground, even if those ideas are still likely to drive  decision-making. 264  
Yet covert discrimination can be among the most pernicious and invidious 
kinds.265  Therefore, even Masterpiece’s extremely narrow doctrinal legacy for 
the Free Exercise Clause will hardly help those seeking free exercise protection. 
 
260. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 219, at 826.  
261. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
262. See, e.g., David French, In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Kennedy Strikes a Blow for the 
Dignity of the Faithful, NAT’L L. REV. (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/06/masterpiece-cakeshop-ruling-religious-liberty-victory 
[https://perma.cc/P6ZL-YXDN] (positing an expansion of religious exemptions). 
263. To be sure, the Court opens up the possibilities for analysis under public-accommodations 
and free-speech frameworks that have broader implications, as the foregoing has asserted; but the 
holding can be boiled down to a command to commissioners to act neutrally.  
264. See Smith v. Emp’t Div., 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Emp’t Div., Dep’t 
of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894, 901 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Laycock & Berg, 
supra note 18 (“Enforcement authorities have now been warned not to state such views on the record, 
so the views will mostly go underground. . . .”); see also supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
265. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 767 (2011) (“[The] 
state action that perpetuates the subordination of historically disadvantaged groups will tend to express 
itself in facially neutral terms.  For this reason, a . . . jurisprudence that turns formalistically on facial 
discrimination will . . . get it exactly backward.”) (citation omitted).  Furthermore, employing the 
hostility rationale is at least in tension with the Court’s recent ruling in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
2392 (2018).  It is beyond the scope of this Article to develop this latter line of analysis, however. 
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Further, it is curious under any principal-agent theory to attribute religious 
hostility to entire multi-tiered proceedings, reviews, and appellate systems 
simply because of the throw-away dicta of a couple of its members.266  The 
majority is guilty of a serious compositional fallacy in doing so, as Justice 
Ginsburg points out.267  More to the point, the commissioners’ statements—
however unnuanced and indelicate they might have been—were not facially 
incorrect.  Religious rationales have undoubtedly been deployed to inflict 
serious social harm.268  But religious rationales have also been appropriated as 
a powerful source for positive social change.269  This latter phenomenon has 
been brought about by people, at every level of government and society—
including the Supreme Court—honestly engaging in robust dialogue, supported 
by thick notions of the common good, catalyzed by criticisms like the Colorado 
Commission’s. 270  Thus, the final point of criticism for Masterpiece is the 
 
266. See Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s 
disposal on these grounds); Laycock & Berg, supra note 18 (arguing that the Court created bad 
precedent in the area of commissioner review).  
267. See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text. 
268. See PAUL FINKELMAN, DEFENDING SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE OLD 
SOUTH: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 31–32 (2003) (discussing the religious argument for 
slavery, couched within biblical passages). 
269. Indeed, almost every momentous socio-political movement in U.S. history has had a 
substantial religious component.  The Civil Rights Movement, for example, was largely an ecclesial 
movement.  See McConnell, supra note 51, at 1421–30 (framing the Free Exercise Clause according 
to the religious and political climate during the colonial era).  See generally NOLL, supra note 212; 
MARK A. NOLL, THE CIVIL WAR AS A THEOLOGICAL CRISIS (2006).   
270. In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, Dr. King not only criticized the consciousness of a 
nation claiming to be “under God,” he also energized the black community to protest segregation.  
Indeed, “[b]efore black and sympathetic white audiences [King] elevated local conflicts” and “framed 
a broadly based rationale for the equality . . . of the races,” and in the latter part of his career he even 
exhibited honest rage in response to glacial political improvements.  RICHARD LISCHER, THE 
PREACHER KING: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE WORD THAT MOVED AMERICA 9, 11–12 
(1995).  I use “thick notions of the common good” to push back against the Rawlsian or Dworkinian 
notion that contentious topics—like the normative values that frame discussion about race, religion, 
and sexual orientation—should not be introduced into the public sphere of a pluralistic society.  See 
generally ROBERT WUTHNOW, AMERICA AND THE CHALLENGES OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY (2005).  
For a criticism of Rawls and Dworkin on this front, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A 
STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 69–70 (1984) (arguing that there is no “presuppositionless” ground on 
which to adjudicate moral claims and that the state’s ostensible neutrality in matters of philosophy and 
theology are in fact charged with ethical significance).  Indeed, even in Piggie Park—which the 
Masterpiece Court was insistent to cite—the Court openly disregarded the defendant’s religious claims 
and suggested that they were “maintained ‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, . . . for oppressive 
reasons,’” “completely groundless,” and “patently frivolous.”  Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 
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Court’s disposal of the case on grounds of hostility, which has potential to 
conceal animus and stultify vigorous debate.271  
*                      *                      * 
This Part amassed a broad range of criticisms, all aimed at the incoherence 
of free exercise jurisprudence and wedding-vendor litigation in the wake of 
Masterpiece.  To recap, in terms of precedential value, public accommodations 
laws would seem to have won the day in wedding-vendor cases if courts address 
these delicate issues with the values animating Masterpiece—and not in 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause, since Smith is presumably still good (even 
if precarious) law.272  By relying on public-accommodations precedent from the 
context of race, the Court suggested that protecting the dignitary rights of 
LGBTQ people constitutes a heightened (and maybe even compelling) 
governmental interest, and it did so in a way that at the very least left Smith 
intact. 273  To this latter point, the Court failed to seize upon an opportunity 
fecund with clarifying potential for free exercise doctrine; instead, free speech 
doctrine occupied most of its analysis.274  Consequently, even though numerous 
commentators have cast Masterpiece as an opinion that favors the religious 
right, a closer read reveals that the decision is teeming with the potential to aid 
the LGBTQ community and to stifle religious rights if effectuated by lower 
courts toward those ends.  
V. THE PRESCRIPTIVE TASK: POTENTIAL PARADIGMS 
Now that the descriptive task has mounted extensive criticism of the current 
jurisprudence guiding wedding-vendor cases à la Masterpiece, it is only fitting 
to suggest a more suitable framework.  In the face of the intricate and competing 
constitutional interests at the juncture of anti-discrimination law and free-
exercise jurisprudence, multiple frameworks have been proposed for 
addressing this complexity.  Many of these frameworks have been quixotic or 
hopeful regarding the peaceable future for free-exercise rights alongside 
 
390 U.S. 400, 402 nn.4–5 (1968).  This seems to be in tension with the Masterpiece majority’s 
insistence on neutrality in adjudicating religious beliefs, especially given the stock the majority places 
in Piggie Park. 
271. See supra Section III.A.  
272. This is because Smith lowers the standard of scrutiny applied to free-exercise challenges 
and allows generally applicable and neutral laws.  See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
273. And as has been argued, the Court did so at the expense of acknowledging material 
differences between two contexts. 
274. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
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statutorily-granted civil rights.275  One example would be to grant religious 
exemptions, but to expand what is included in the term “religious” so that it 
gains traction with non-religious people.276 The rest of the frameworks have 
been either concerning277 or truly concerning,278 favoring one set of rights so 
extensively that others become occluded.  In the face of such cherished 
competing rights, no easy solutions should come to mind—be they broad 
exemptions, no exemptions, qualified exemptions, or otherwise.279  But by the 
same token, one consideration is often overlooked, or summarily dismissed, in 
all of these proposals—objective analysis of religious sincerity.  This 
consideration could bring facility and clarity to the resolution of wedding-
vendor cases.  Accordingly, this Part advances a proposal that largely builds on 
 
275. See, e.g., Josiah N. Drew, Comment, Caught Between the Scylla and Charybdis: 
Ameliorating the Collision Course of Sexual Orientation Anti-Discrimination Rights and Religious 
Free Exercise Rights in the Public Workplace, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 287, 288 (2002) (arguing that 
because “gay antidiscrimination rights are among the newest,” and therefore “weaker” than religious 
freedom rights, LGBTQ-rights proponents can “gain greater social and legal recognition” by drawing 
attention to the similarities between these conflicting rights); Rienzi, supra note 183, at 23 (positing 
that substantive due process could protect people on both sides of the aisle and “demonstrate that same-
sex marriage and religious liberty need not conflict.”). 
276. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The 
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1268 (1994).  
“Conscience,” then, would serve as the touchstone for analyzing free exercise issues.  As will be shown 
below, this attempt misses the mark by watering down religious protection. 
277. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Ryan T. Anderson, Ph.D., and African-American & Civil 
Rights Leaders in Support of Petitioners at 5, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) (arguing for sweeping exemptions under the rationale 
that sexual orientation rights should be treated like women’s reproductive rights); Douglas 
Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 
201–06 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008) (proposing 
broad exemptions and a distinction between civil and religious marriage). Professor Laycock scales 
this approach back in his Masterpiece amicus brief and in his commentary on the opinion.  Brief of 
Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 91, at 21–28 (arguing 
that only a very narrow exemption should be granted). 
278. See Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons to 
Say No, 38 HARV. J. L. & GEND. 177, 178–79 (arguing that religious exemptions should be 
categorically rejected); NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 184, at 2574–78 (arguing that religious 
exemptions must be restricted to ensure equal access to the markets, equal dignity to LGBTQ people, 
and third-party harms). 
279. For a novel approach advancing negotiation between parties that builds off of previously 
successful attempts to negotiate issues involving anti-discrimination and religious liberty, see Ira C. 
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 
302 (2010); see also Minow, supra note 219 and accompanying text (proposing a negotiation and virtue 
ethics approach premised on “humility”).  
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precedent already set in the area of religious exemptions from the educational 
context described above—particularly from Yoder.280  Professor Laycock’s 
approach from his Masterpiece amicus brief—suggesting very narrow religious 
exceptions—also informs this Yoderian paradigm.281  After outlining the 
paradigm in the first Section of this Part, the subsequent Section will use a few 
fact patterns as test suites to demonstrate how a Yoderian framework could be 
employed by courts.  
A. In Search of Objective Criteria: A Yoderian Proposal 
Numerous commentators have rightly argued that courts should avoid 
examining objective factors that would test the sincerity of a religious 
objector’s beliefs.282  This is because requiring a demonstration of religious 
sincerity is generally believed to chill free exercise.283  In recent years, the 
Supreme Court and lower courts have largely followed this movement toward 
examining religious beliefs and traditions subjectively and deferentially—that 
is, courts do not typically question an exemption seeker’s subjective religious 
 
280. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.  As will be argued, this is a more prudent 
framework than one that relies on analogies to the context of race. 
281. See Brief of Christian Legal Society et al., supra note 91, at 6.  
282. See, e.g., Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion: A Subjective Alternative, 102 HARV. 
L. REV. 1258, 1262 (1989) (arguing for a subjective analysis of religion and discouraging examinations 
into an objector’s religious sincerity); Minow, supra note 219, at 828 (arguing that objective factors 
“draw government actors into assessments of religious tenets” in a way that does not invite robust 
religious liberty). 
283. See Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, supra note 282, at 1262–63.  It might also be 
reasonably argued that such inquiries could raise establishment clause concerns, leading the 
government to become over-involved in religion by determining what constitutes “sincere” religious 
belief.  Although this issue cannot be taken up in lengthy detail, it is sufficient to note that the 
Establishment Clause does not, or should not, stretch that far in light of the principles animating its 
enactment.  These principles did not favor an absolute and comprehensive separation of church and 
state, as some have argued.  See generally LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (rev. ed. 
1967).  Rather, voluminous founding-era evidence demonstrates that the Establishment Clause was 
intended to prevent a nationally established religion as well as governmental preference of one religion 
to another.  See generally ROBERT CORD, THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL 
FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982) (collecting a wide range of founding era documents substantiating 
a narrower view of the Establishment Clause).  Constitutional jurisprudence also seems to be trending 
toward this narrower view, although no Rubicon has been crossed in this area.  See, e.g., Trinity 
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2028–31 (2017); Am. Legion v. Am. 
Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2079–89 (2019). 
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beliefs as an initial gatekeeping matter.284  In most circumstances, this impulse 
is proper.  A person seeking religious exemption should be entitled to the 
presumption that his or her religious beliefs are earnestly held.  This subjective 
deference should not be categorical for all free exercise claims, though.  In cases 
where religious beliefs implicate other enshrined constitutional values—as in 
wedding-vendor cases—courts should apply objective criteria to sift sincere 
religious objections from objections made with animus toward people of a 
protected class.  This framework is indebted to Wisconsin v. Yoder.285 
In Yoder, the Court required the religious-exemption seeker to demonstrate 
a nexus to a religious tradition.286  In particular, the Court examined evidence—
proffered by expert witnesses, testimony, and documents—demonstrating that 
the religious objector’s religious practice of vocational education was (a) 
embedded within an established religious tradition, (b) performed pursuant to a 
sincerely held religious belief, and (c) constituted a practice central to the 
Amish community of faith.287  Yoder’s ability to satisfy these criteria was nearly 
dispositive.288  Yoder’s sincerity satisfied the Court that Yoder was not 
arbitrarily seeking an exemption from a law pertaining to one of the state’s  
most vital areas of interest—education.289  Rather, exemption was necessary for 
the sake of Yoder’s retaining the religious practices of vocational training and 
simplicity of life.290  Inquests of this nature are the precise types of inquiries 
that should apply to the wedding-vendor context (or really any context in which 
free exercise values affect other compelling constitutional interests).  This 
would smoke out the beliefs rooted in animus while providing the breathing 
space necessary for sincerely held religious practices to thrive.  And there are 
ways that this paradigm could—and should—be applied to prevent judicial 
 
284. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990) (refraining 
from examining the centrality of peyote usage to the exemption seeker’s religion); Paul 
Barker, Comment, Religious Exemptions and the Vocational Dimension of Work, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
169, 170 (2019) (“[C]ourts and other adjudicating bodies rarely attempt more than a cursory 
examination of those beliefs for coherence, consistency, or even (in some cases) religiosity.”).  But see 
Graham v. Comm’r, 822 F.2d 844, 848–49 (9th Cir. 1987) (examining objective factors to assess the 
sincerity of charitable deductions to certain payments made to the taxpayers’ church). 
285. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  
286. Id. at 215.  
287. Id. at 235.  
288. Id.  The Court also subjected the compulsory education law to strict scrutiny.  See supra 
note 57 and accompanying text. 
289. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216–18.  
290. See REBELL, supra note 60, at 38. 
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overreach or Establishment Clause concerns.  How could this balance be 
maintained? 
A religious claimant should enter into an adjudicatory proceeding with a 
rebuttable presumption that their religious beliefs are sincere and rooted in an 
established religious tradition.  This presumption would prevent judicial 
scrutiny that could chill essential religious practices.  However, because the 
reciprocal interests in these cases are by definition weighty, an opposing party 
would be allowed to rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the religious 
objector is motivated by animus, or that his practice is either peripheral to, or 
beyond the pale of, a colorable religious tradition.  
If successful, this showing would then shift the burden back to the religious 
claimant to prove (a) that their conduct is embedded in, and important to, an 
established religious tradition, (b) that they are a member of that religious 
tradition, and (c) that the conduct is central to the continued practice of that 
religious tradition.291  If these criteria are satisfied, then a narrow exemption—
narrowly tailored to the tradition’s teachings and practices—could be granted 
to small businesses so long as a practice did not violate the public health, safety, 
or order, which is a requirement for every religious practice at any rate. 292  
These objective criteria would include certain traditions by virtue of certain 
conduct and exclude others for similar conduct, but they would lead to more 
equitable results overall.  
By way of example, in the Episcopal Church or Presbyterian Church of the 
United States of America, LGBTQ marriage and ordination is embraced and 
encouraged; so religious exemption claims from wedding vendors within these 
traditions would be less availing.293  However, if a Shi’ite/Sunni Muslim, 
Orthodox Jew, or Roman Catholic sought a religious exemption for the same 
reason, he would stand a stronger chance of obtaining one because opposition 
to same-sex marriage has a historical basis in and doctrinal centrality to these 
 
291. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.  This rubric can also be framed in the negative.  That is to say, the 
exemption seeker could prove that he must refrain from specified conduct because engaging in the 
conduct—e.g., designing a cake for same-sex weddings—would violate central tenets of the faith 
tradition to which he belongs. 
292. For treatment of this triad, see id. at 220.  
293. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Episcopal Split as Conservatives Form New Group, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/us/04episcopal.html 
[https://perma.cc/N97X-PALW] (describing the Anglican/Episcopal split of the same-sex ordination 
and marriage question). 
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traditions that extend back millennia.294  And doctrines pertaining to sexuality 
are likely to be entrenched and perennial for these traditions.295  For a United 
Methodist, on the other hand, the case would be closer because LGBTQ 
marriage and ordination are largely unsettled issues within that tradition.296 
It might be objected that this emphasis on religious tradition is unfounded.  
If there were dissenters from within those religious traditions in which LGBTQ 
rights were celebrated, a Yoderian template would be underinclusive, one might 
argue.  Yet without the religious community, there are scarcely individual 
religious rights worth preserving in the first place—at least not in any 
meaningful sense.297  And requiring rootedness in a religious tradition prevents 
 
294. See, e.g., UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH, art. 6, § 3 (1994) (outlining the church’s belief that marriage is between a man and woman).  
The enumeration of these religions is underinclusive and paints with too broad of a brush stroke.  For 
instance, there are plenty of Catholics that do not abide by or believe in these teachings.  These 
traditions are nonetheless invoked here for illustrative and synechdochical purposes, even if they are 
slightly caricatured. 
295. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
296. See, e.g., Emma Green, The Divided Methodist Church, THE ATLANTIC (May 18, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/divided-methodist-church-lgbt/483396/ 
[https://perma.cc/H7L5-FEQS] (discussing the mixed treatment of LGBTQ issues in the United 
Methodist Church and framing it within the broader theological conversation of other traditions).  
Although a recent general counsel affirmed the traditional view of marriage, the topic remains 
controversial in the United Methodist Church.  See, e.g., Tom Gjelten, After Disagreements Over 
LGBTQ Clergy, U.S. Methodists Move Closer to Split, NPR (June 26, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/06/26/736344079/u-s-methodists-meet-to-consider-what-comes-next-
after-disagreements-over-lgbt-cl [https://perma.cc/8G5M-ZPG8] (discussing the unsettled nature of 
LGBTQ marriage and ordination within the United Methodist Church). 
297. See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious 
Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99 (1989) (discussing the importance of prioritizing organizational 
rights and highlighting the influence of liberalism and secularism on group religious rights); Austin J. 
Rogers, Note, East of Eden: A Contractual Lens for an Unsettled Area of First Amendment Shunning 
Jurisprudence, 68 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1308–10 (2019) (emphasizing the primacy of organizational rights 
in determining the shape of individual free exercise rights).  This assertion depends, of course, on how 
the enigmatic term “religion” is defined.  And the Supreme Court has certainly punted on proffering 
definitional guidance numerous times, most recently in Masterpiece.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018) (indicating that the Free Exercise Clause 
protects “religious and philosophical objections”).  But if “philosophical” objections and recently 
concocted religions are protected (at least by the Free Exercise Clause), this raises the question of what 
conduct would not be protected under such an anemic articulation of religion.  In any event, most 
religious rights are exercised within the context of a religious community.  See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the 
government . . . could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State [if] a correlative 
freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”).  Or as Stanley 
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the possibility that some exemption seekers would fabricate religious belief or 
feign religious devotion in a feeble attempt to practice hostile discrimination.  
Therefore, some religious objectors might have to tolerate a certain degree of 
under-inclusion for the sake of prioritizing static and preeminent organizational 
free-exercise rights. 
Furthermore, although potentially under-inclusive, this template occupies a 
liminal space between LGBTQ activists and those seeking to decline service 
because of their religion, requiring both “sides” to cede at least some territory.  
Therefore, a certain free-exercise institutionalism is warranted to encourage 
compromise in cases where free-exercise rights and other important legal rights 
collide.298  In short, a Yoderian framework strikes the balance that LGBTQ 
rights and free exercise rights demand, it averts spurious claims to free exercise, 
and it upholds the integrity and rights of religious institutions to practice 
religion free from governmental infringement—which is a necessary condition 
for individual religious rights to flourish, like those espoused by wedding-
vendors. 
B. A Few Brief Applications 
This Section offers an application of a Yoderian framework.  Because the 
prescriptive arguments in this Article are more tentatively held than the 
foregoing descriptive arguments, this Section will be comparatively brief and 
aimed at praxis. 
Applying a Yoderian framework to the facts in Piggie Park, Bessinger’s 
initial claim that the public accommodations laws infringed his free exercise 
 
Hauerwas observes, “[t]his is not to suggest that our actions, decisions and choices are unimportant, 
but rather that the church has a stake in holding together our being and behaving in such a manner that 
our doing only can be a reflection of our character.”  STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE 
KINGDOM: A PRIMER IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 33–34 (1983).  Elsewhere, Hauerwas notes that “the 
church does not have a social ethic; the church is a social ethic.”  Id. at 99.  In other words, the religious 
community is the necessary condition for the flourishing of religious practices.  This reality gives rise 
to the need to correspondingly prize the community qua religious tradition in the free exercise context.   
298. For the proposition that constitutional provisions are intended to be structural guarantees, 
see generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).  
Professor Amar’s trenchant scholarly work argues that the Bill of Rights was intended to be a structural 
bridle on governmental power, rather than a conveyance of proliferous and private individual rights. 
Id. at 1131–33.  The institutional aspect of the Yoderian framework finds support in Professor Amar’s 
interpretation, even for individuals claiming exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause.  See also 
Rogers, supra note 297, at 1308–20 (proposing that organizational religious rights should enjoy 
weightier consideration when they are pitted against the individual dignitary rights protected by 
common law doctrines like defamation). 
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rights would be entitled to an incipient presumption that his beliefs were 
sincerely held.  However, by shedding light on Bessinger’s forceful threats 
against African Americans and his other facially frivolous claims (e.g., that the 
public accommodations law represented an uncompensated governmental 
taking), his ostensible religious commitments would be easily rebutted.  
Bessinger, then, would be required to demonstrate that his refusal to serve 
African Americans met Yoder’s objective criteria.  At this point, Bessinger 
would fail because it is doubtful that he could find a religious tradition that 
participated in racial discrimination as an important, longstanding religious 
practice.  The public accommodations law would not even merit interest 
balancing in that instance.  But even if Bessinger’s claim did make it past this 
stage, a court would duly refuse an exemption because Bessinger’s 
discrimination violates the public health-safety-order triad;299 plus, the public 
accommodations law was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
government interest—namely, the government’s interest in ensuring equal 
access to goods in a prejudicial marketplace. 
The facts in Masterpiece are closer to the borderline.  Applying the 
Yoderian paradigm to Phillips, the decision would have likely come out the 
same, with a few slight nuances.  Phillips’s religious beliefs would be 
presumptively sincere, and it is doubtful that this sincerity could be rebutted as 
disguised animus, especially since he was open to offering Craig and Mullins 
any other goods.300  Still, assuming that the couple rebutted this presumption, it 
is likely that a court would find that Phillips’s beliefs were rooted in a religious 
tradition’s teaching—in all likelihood an evangelical religious tradition.301  So 
 
299. For an explanation of the ways that the triad predicts, interacts with, and deputizes strict 
scrutiny analysis, see supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text.  For an example of the Court properly 
refusing exemption based on free-exercise appeals, see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 
574, 604 (1983) (“[T]he Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial 
discrimination in education—discrimination that prevailed, with official approval, for the first 165 
years of this Nation’s constitutional history.  That governmental interest substantially outweighs 
whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners’ exercise of their religious beliefs.”).  Of 
course, the assertion that these beliefs were sincerely held is dubious and that racial discrimination is 
typically central to most religious communities.  See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text.  But 
the point still stands. 
300. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  It should also be noted that no party claimed that 
Phillips’s beliefs lacked sincerity. 
301. The term “Evangelical” is admittedly inexact and very often misused.  See, e.g., Murray, 
supra note 180 at 282 (speaking about “Evangelicals” in a simplistic and overgeneralized fashion).  
And Phillips’s specific religious tradition is absent from the record or other court documents, outside 
of the fact that his Christian tradition is “biblically based.”  Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.  Without 
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Phillips’s religious beliefs would probably pass the objective Yoderian hurdle 
and present the Court with the task of deciding the free exercise standard that it 
should apply to the public accommodations law—which should be strict 
scrutiny review given the Free Exercise Clause’s historical treatment and the 
aberrant nature of its present treatment under Smith.  If religious rights were no 
longer protected under Sherbert’s strict scrutiny standard, however, the Court 
should make that clear through a direct and explicit ruling, rather than a 
casuistic inquiry into what “speech” constitutes speech for the purposes of First 
Amendment protection.  But this points to another virtue of the proposal: it 
encourages the Court to clarify free exercise doctrine. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In a recent case in which a flower shop owner, Barronelle Stutzman, refused 
to create a wedding arrangement for a same-sex couple, the Supreme Court of 
Washington held that the shop owner was not entitled to a religious 
exemption.302  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, then vacated 
judgment and “remanded to the Supreme Court of Washington for further 
consideration in light of Masterpiece . . . .”303  This Article commends against 
such “further consideration” to the extent that Masterpiece muddles the legal 
 
more facts about Phillip’s religious tradition, “Evangelical” is intended to serve as a mere placeholder.  
Further, numerous religious exemptions would probably be sought from “Evangelicals” or other 
nebulous traditions.  In such instances, it would become important to define with precision the tradition 
in which the religious member is situated, even if the tradition is broadly articulated.  For a fruitful and 
precise definition of “Evangelical,” see DAVID WILLIAM BEBBINGTON, EVANGELICALISM IN MODERN 
BRITAIN: A HISTORY FROM THE 1730S TO THE 1980S 2–3, 273–74 (1989) (coining the four tenets of 
evangelical faith and distinguishing them from fundamentalism).  Those within non-denominational 
traditions might also present difficulties, but would still be able to be ascertained by examining 
ecclesial bylaws, examining witnesses, etc.  These traditions might also be best analyzed according to 
what Ludwig Wittgenstein called “family resemblances.”  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 32 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953).  In other words, non-denominational traditions 
might need to be analyzed by reference to other traditions (e.g., Baptist or charismatic traditions).  On 
a related note, traditions that a Yoderian template would not protect are atheism or agnosticism—not 
because their beliefs or conduct are any less worthy of respect, but because the Free Exercise Clause 
was intended to protect religious traditions, practices, and forms of life, and other legal doctrines offer 
protections if proper.  See McConnell, supra note 51, at 1487 n.400 (tracing the founding intent of the 
Free Exercise Clause and arguing that the intent was to protect religious traditions).  This wrinkle 
draws further attention to the Court’s need to clarify the meaning of “religion,” as well as the 
establishment and free exercise thereof. 
302. Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 568 (Wash. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 
2671 (2018). 
303. Arlene’s Flowers, 138 S. Ct. 2671. 
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analysis of wedding-vendor cases.  In fact, when the Washington Supreme 
Court examined Stutzman’s case on remand, it was subject to several of the 
errors described above.304  Not only was Masterpiece untowardly followed, but 
its operative jurisprudence caused the Washington Supreme Court to render a 
ruling too shallow in analysis and too reliant on oblique legal doctrines (or 
otherwise too covert in animus against religious objectors).  
 That is because under Masterpiece, the doctrine that does seem to be clear 
encourages race-based anti-discrimination precedent and free speech doctrine 
to drive legal analysis.  In doing so, it subjects a religious wedding-vendor to 
tangential, inapposite legal paradigms from contexts foreign to the Free 
Exercise Clause.  But Stutzman’s religious beliefs are not akin to those held by 
Bessinger in Piggie Park, and her exemption requests are not fundamentally 
about her right to refrain from speaking.  Her exemption requests reflect 
sincerely held religious beliefs that find a home in free exercise values.  
Masterpiece left jurists to ad hoc guesswork in an area of great 
constitutional import.  But First Amendment values are too sacred for a judge’s 
druthers to dictate wedding-vendor cases rather than the rule of law.  To be sure, 
a Yoderian template might burden members of conservative religious 
communities (i.e. through certain evidentiary requirements), and it might 
burden members of the LGBTQ community (through narrow exceptions that 
inflict dignitary harm).  Yet to protect other religious interests—e.g., those of 
religious minorities—and to uphold the integrity of a broader public 
accommodations regime, a Yoderian trade-off strikes a prudent balance 
between competing rights in the search for common ground.  No simplistic 
solution serves as a panacea when cherished rights collide.  Nevertheless, a 
Yoderian framework would correct some of the most glaring issues in current 
constitutional jurisprudence and squarely address the legal issues implicated by 
wedding-vendor cases.  
 
304. Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1228 (Wash. 2019).  To name only 
a few of the blunders, the Washington Supreme Court dubiously relied on Piggie Park, id. at 1214–15, 
1235 n.27, spent an inordinate amount of focus on free speech doctrine (although the court rightly 
observed that free exercise was a more relevant constitutional consideration), id. at 1224–28, refused 
to apply any form of heightened scrutiny to laws burdening religion despite the historical standard 
under which free-exercise claims have been analyzed, id. at 1231–32, and even fell subject to a hybrid 
rights analysis, id. at 1236–37. 
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Stutzman has appealed to the United States Supreme Court once again.305  
And Stutzman’s requests for exemption, however bigoted they might appear to 
outsiders, deserve a principled and equitable hearing. 
Yoderian principles would resolve Stutzman’s case by either leaving her 
free to select which floral masterpieces she wants to arrange or letting her know 
where she stands—and under what guiding legal principles—if she lacks such 
freedom.  A Yoderian framework is more attractive than the masterpieces of 
simplicity delivered by recent jurists and commentators.  It empowers courts, 
couples, and cakemakers to disagree over their guiding principles with greater 
clarity and, God forbid, greater charity.  And because a Yoderian framework is 
attuned to the subtleties inherent to sexuality and religion, it preserves the 
shared and steadfast right of all to retain complexity.   
 
 
305. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Arlene’s Flowers, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (No. 19-
333).  
